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INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the Supreme Court was largely quiet in the realm of patent 
law, issuing only two rulings on the topic. In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court decided that new 
wording in the America Invents Act’s (AIA) on-sale bar did not 
overturn the Court’s precedent regarding the applicability of the on-
sale bar to secret sales of patents.2 The Court also determined, in Return 
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service,3 that a federal agency of the 
 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 634. 
 3. 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019). 
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United States was not a “person” and is thus not able to petition for 
post grant review under the AIA.4 
The upcoming Supreme Court term, however, looks to be much 
more exciting. The Court has granted certiorari for cases arguing a 
variety of patent issues, including whether the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) can move for attorney fees when it defends 
its decisions to deny patent applications in district court,5 whether 
institution decisions for inter partes reviews are appealable,6 and 
whether patent eligibility is a question of both fact and law. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was, as always, busy 
in the patent field. With about half of its appeals originating from the 
PTO, it is unsurprising that many of its cases dealt with procedures of 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or “the Board”). Indeed, the 
constitutionality of the PTAB itself was successfully challenged before 
the Federal Circuit this year. Of course, the Federal Circuit also issued 
many opinions regarding novel issues arising in the district courts, such 
as state sovereign immunity. This Article collects and summarizes many 
of the Federal Circuit’s 2019 patent decisions and analyzes their effect 
on the practice of patent law. 
I.    CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
While many of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction decisions 
were made in accordance with Phillips v. AWH Corp.,7 several discussed 
discrete issues within that framework. For example, Forest Laboratories, 
LLC v. Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC8 analyzed the use of the word 
“and” in a claimed list.9 The patent-at-issue claimed “[a] method for 
treating tension, excitation, anxiety, and psychotic and schizophrenic 
disorders.”10 The district court construed the claim to exclude the 
treatment of bipolar disorders.11 After reading the claim and 
specification, the Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “[t]he use of 
the conjunction ‘and’ before ‘psychotic and schizophrenic disorders’ 
indicates that ‘psychotic and schizophrenic disorders’ is a distinct item 
 
 4. Id. at 1867–68. 
 5. Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1292 (2019). 
 6. Dex Media, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 139 S. Ct. 2742 (2019). 
 7. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 8. 918 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 9. Id. at 938. 
 10. Id. at 932 (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. at 938. 
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on the list.”12 The naming of these specific types of disorders stood—
in the court’s mind—in stark contrast with the rest of the list, the 
elements of which were used in the specification as describing covered 
symptoms.13 Because bipolar I disorder may include the symptom of 
“excitation,” the Federal Circuit vacated the claim construction and 
remanded the infringement issue back to the district court.14 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit decided the limiting effect of a 
“wherein” clause in Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc.15 The claim language 
at issue there had two separate “wherein” clauses: an efficacy “wherein” 
clause and a safety “wherein” clause.16 The appellant argued that the 
“wherein” clauses only stated intended results and that they were not 
material to patentability.17 The court disagreed.18 The specification and 
prosecution history showed that the patent owner conveyed to a person 
of skill in the art and the patent office that the efficacy and safety of the 
claimed method were material to patentability; thus, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the clauses were limiting.19 
Two cases also discussed means-plus-function constructions. First, in 
MTD Products Inc. v. Iancu,20 the Federal Circuit reviewed the USPTO’s 
claim construction of a potential means-plus-function claim.21 
Specifically, the Board held that the claim term “mechanical control 
assembly . . . configured to” perform some function was not a mean-
plus-function claim subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.22 The Board 
reasoned that the specification provided structural definition to the 
term such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand 
that the term “denote[s] structure.”23 
The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, ultimately holding 
that the specification at issue did not provide enough corresponding 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (noting, also, that the parties agreed that there was “no such thing as an 
‘excitation disorder’”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 935 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 16. Id. at 1374. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1374–75. 
 19. Id. at 1375–76. 
 20. 933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 21. Id. at 1338. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1340. 
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structure to remove the claim term from a means-plus-function term.24 
The court stated that the Board “erred by using the existence of 
corresponding structure in the specification to conclude that [the 
claim term] has a sufficiently definite structure to evade § 112, ¶ 6.”25 
The Board also erred in giving improper weight to statements taken 
out of context in the prosecution history when defining structure.26 
Vacating and remanding, the court noted that the Board could reach 
a different conclusion on obviousness in light of this holding.27 
The court also discussed the effect of nonce words on means-plus-
function claims in TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Systems International, 
Inc.28 Nonce words are generic terms such as “mechanism,” “device,” 
or “element” that “reflect nothing more than verbal constructs that 
may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the 
word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently 
definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.”29 In TEK, 
the appellee Sealant Systems International (“SSI”) argued that 
“‘conduits connecting the container’ and ‘container connecting 
conduit’ should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 because the term ‘conduit’ is a nonce word.”30 The 
Federal Circuit disagreed, and upheld the lower court’s decision that 
“conduit” recites a definite, physical structure that is known to those 
skilled in the mechanical arts.31 When read in light of the claim 
language, the dependent claims, and the specification, “conduit” in 
the patent in question in TEK refers to a physical structure used to 
connect other elements of the device.32 The court also gave credence 
to the prosecution history because it clearly documented the 
applicant’s intention to use “conduit” to avoid § 112, ¶ 6 issues.33 
Finally, the court also addressed disavowal in two cases. At issue in 
Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp.34 was whether the district court 
 
 24. Id. at 1344–45. 
 25. Id. at 1345. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1338, 1345. 
 28. 920 F.3d 777 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 29. Id. at 785 (quoting Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015)). 
 30. Id. (quoting Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350). 
 31. Id. at 785–86. 
 32. Id. at 786. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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erred in limiting the claims to require a repeated desmear process.35 The 
Federal Circuit determined that statements in the specification did not 
rise to the level of a “clear and unmistakable disclaimer” or disavowal of 
claim scope but were merely a description of a preferred method.36 
Similarly, with respect to the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit 
held that an expert’s declaration responding to indefiniteness and 
written description rejections was also not a clear disavowal.37 
The Federal Circuit also noted that because it was not clear that the 
repeated etching process is “an essential part of the claimed invention,” 
it was improper to read the process limitation into the product claims.38 
The Federal Circuit remanded for further proceedings.39 
In Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,40 the court decided 
that it was proper for a district court to look to the prosecution history 
for guidance without having to first find a clear disavowal.41 The claim 
term at issue was “high quality of service connection.”42 The court 
determined that this was a “coined term”; thus, it was acceptable to 
look to the prosecution history to construe the claim.43 
The Federal Circuit addressed whether a preamble was limiting in 
In re Fought.44 The patent application at issue related to the 
construction of the preamble term “travel trailer.”45 The examiner 
initially rejected the application as anticipated by prior art related to a 
“conventional truck trailer” and “a bulkhead for shipping 
compartments.”46 Despite the applicant’s argument that a travel trailer 
is a recreational vehicle, the examiner maintained the rejection.47 The 
Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection, stating that the preamble term 
was “a mere statement of intended use that does not limit the claim.”48 
 
 35. Id. at 794–95. 
 36. Id. at 797 (internal quotations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 798–99. 
 38. Id. at 799. 
 39. Id. at 800. 
 40. 933 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 41. Id. at 1352–53. 
 42. Id. at 1348–49. 
 43. Id. at 1350–51. 
 44. 941 F.3d 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 45. Id. at 1177. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Noting that the body of the claim recited the term “travel trailer” in 
a manner that relied on the preamble for its antecedent basis, the 
Federal Circuit ruled that the term was a substantive limitation.49 The 
court directly addressed the issue stating that “[w]e have repeatedly 
held a preamble limiting when it serves as antecedent basis for a term 
appearing in the body of a claim” as it did in this case.50 
II.    VALIDITY 
A.   Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
The Federal Circuit continued to expand on its patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in 2019. In Athena 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC,51 Athena Diagnostics 
(“Athena”) sued Mayo Collaborative Services (“Mayo”) alleging 
infringement of a patent covering methods for diagnosing 
neurological disorders by detecting antibodies to MuSK, a membrane 
protein.52 Mayo moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the asserted 
claims of the patent are invalid under § 101.53 The district court 
granted Mayo’s motion, concluding that the claims were invalid under 
§ 101 for claiming ineligible subject matter.54 The Federal Circuit 
affirmed and reiterated that claims reciting only conventional steps to 
detect a natural law are patent ineligible under § 101.55 
The Federal Circuit followed the two-part test set forth in Alice Corp. 
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International56 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.57 to determine if the claimed matter was 
patent-eligible.58 First, it held that the claims were directed to a law of 
nature, namely, the correlation between the presence of naturally 
occurring MuSK autoantibodies in bodily fluid and MuSK-related 
neurological diseases.59 The court stated that the claimed advance was 
only in the discovery of a natural law and that the additional claim steps 
 
 49. Id. at 1178–79. 
 50. Id. at 1178. 
 51. 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 52. Id. at 746–47. 
 53. Id. at 746. 
 54. Id. at 746–47. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 57. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 58. Athena Diagniostics, Inc., 915 F.3d at 749. 
 59. Id. at 750. 
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only apply conventional techniques to observe that natural law.60 At the 
second step of the Alice/Mayo inquiry, the court held that the claims 
did not recite an inventive concept sufficient to transform the law of 
nature into a patent-eligible application of the natural law.61 The court 
stated that the claim steps not drawn to the law of nature only required 
standard techniques applied in a conventional way, e.g., a conventional 
radioimmunoassay.62 The court accordingly held that the challenged 
claims were ineligible for patent protection.63 
Then, in Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, 
LLC,64 Natural Alternatives International (“Natural Alternatives”) asserted 
patents directed to using a natural substance to “increas[e] the anaerobic 
working capacity of muscle and other tissues.”65 Some contained method 
claims and others contained product and manufacturing claims.66 At the 
district court, Creative Compounds LLC (“Creative Compounds”) moved 
for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the asserted claims were 
directed to a natural law or product of nature, lacked any inventive 
concept, and, therefore, were ineligible for patenting under § 101.67 
The district court granted the motion.68 
 
 60. Id. at 751. 
 61. Id. at 753–54. 
 62. Id. Athena argued the district court needed to consider an expert declaration 
and conduct fact-finding before it could resolve whether the claims covered more than 
conventional techniques. Id. at 755. The Court rejected this argument, finding that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to convert a 12(b)(6) motion 
into a summary judgment motion. Id. The Court explained that the “declaration does 
not ‘merge into the pleadings’ as the complaint does not reference it or otherwise 
depend on it.” Id. Moreover, the Court explained the district court did not have to 
consider the declaration because it was “not consistent with the complaint read in light 
of the [challenged] patent.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 757. Judge Newman dissented. See generally id. at 757 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). In her opinion, the claims covered a multi-step method of diagnosis for “a 
previously undiagnosable neurological condition,” not a law of nature. Id. at 757, 759. 
According to Judge Newman, “[t]he reaction between the antibody and the MuSK 
protein was not previously known, nor was it known to form a labeled MuSK or its 
epitope, nor to form the antibody/MuSK complex, immunoprecipitate the complex, 
and monitor for radioactivity, thereby diagnosing these previously undiagnosable 
neurotransmission disorders.” Id. at 758. In her opinion, this “man-made chemical 
biomedical procedure” should have been patent eligible, consistent with the otherwise 
broad prescription of § 101. Id. at 762–64. 
 64. 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 65. Id. at 1341–42. 
 66. Id. at 1341, 1343, 1347, 1349. 
 67. Id. at 1341–42, 1344, 1350. 
 68. Id. at 1341–42. 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.69 For the 
method claims, the court held, under Natural Alternatives’ proposed 
constructions, the claims were directed to more than a natural law.70 
In the court’s view, the claims embodied the benefit of natural 
substances and the administration of those substances according to a 
specific dosage and manner.71 The court found persuasive that the 
claims “specify particular results to be obtained by practicing the 
method,” “specify a compound to be administered to achieve the 
claimed result,” and also “contain a dosage limitation.”72 As such, the 
claims were deemed patent-eligible “method of treatment” claims.73 
For the product claims, the court held they were also eligible for 
patent protection.74 The court explained that although beta-alanine 
was a natural product, the claims were not directed to beta-alanine.75 
In the court’s view, the claims were “directed to specific treatment 
formulations that incorporate[ed] natural products, but they ha[d] 
different characteristics and [could] be used in a manner that beta-
alanine as it appear[ed] in nature [could not].”76 As such, the claims 
were deemed patent eligible.77 
And, for the manufacturing claims, the court held they were “even 
further removed from the natural law and product of nature at issue” 
in the other claims.78 In the court’s view, the claims covered the 
manufacture of a human dietary supplement with certain characteristics; 
the supplement was not a product of nature, nor was its use to achieve 
a specific result directed to a law of nature.79 As such, these claims were 
also deemed patent eligible.80 
 
 69. Id. at 1350. 
 70. Id. at 1345. 
 71. Id. at 1345–47. 
 72. Id. at 1345–46. 
 73. Id. In dictum, the Court explained that factual impediments exist with regard 
to step two of the Alice/Mayo framework that would have also precluded judgment on 
the pleadings. Id. at 1349. 
 74. Id. at 1348–49. 
 75. Id. at 1348. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1348–49. 
 78. Id. at 1350. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. Judge Reyna concurred in part and dissented in part based on his 
disagreement with the panel majority’s reliance on what he considered erroneous 
claim constructions. See generally id. at 1351 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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In SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,81 SRI International, Inc. 
(“SRI”) sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”) alleging infringement of two of 
its network surveillance patents.82 Cisco moved for summary judgment on 
several issues, including that the claims were patent ineligible under 
§ 101.83 The district court denied Cisco’s motion for summary judgment 
of ineligibility, and Cisco appealed from that denial.84 
The Federal Circuit affirmed that the claims were subject matter 
eligible under step one of the Alice/Mayo framework because they were 
not directed to an abstract idea, but rather to an improvement in 
existing computer network technology.85 In the court’s view, the claims 
were directed to using a specific technique to solve a technological 
problem that arises in computer networks, that is, identifying hackers 
or potential intruders into a network by using a plurality of network 
monitors to analyze data on that network and integrate reports using one 
or more hierarchical monitors.86 This understanding was also confirmed 
by the patent’s specification, which, the court noted, explained the claims 
were directed to solving “weakness in conventional networks.”87 
Cisco had argued these claims were analogous to claims found 
ineligible in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A.,88 as being directed 
to generic steps required to collect and analyze data.89 The court 
rejected this contention, distinguishing Electric Power because the 
claims there “were drawn to using computers as tools to solve a power 
grid problem,” whereas the claims here were drawn to “improving the 
functionality of computers and computer networks themselves.”90 
In Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc.,91 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s determination that the challenged claims were valid 
under § 101.92 The asserted patent described its invention as a system 
 
 81. 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 82. Id. at 1301. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1301–02. 
 85. Id. at 1303. 
 86. Id. at 1303–04. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 89. SRI Int’l, Inc., 930 F.3d at 1304 (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 931 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 92. Id. at 1163. The district court based its determination in part on the USPTO 
PTAB’s denial of a CBM petition, wherein the PTAB concluded that the challenged 
claim was not directed to any abstract idea, but rather to a physical process, e.g., 
processing paper checks. See id. at 1165. The district court further concluded, in the 
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and a method for processing paper checks wherein “(1) ‘data from 
checks is captured at the point of purchase,’ (2) ‘this data is used to 
promptly process a deposit to the merchant’s account,’ (3) the paper 
checks are moved elsewhere ‘for scanning and image capture,’ and (4) 
‘the image of the check is matched up to the data file.’”93 
Applying the two-step Alice/Mayo framework, the Federal Circuit first 
held the claims were directed to an abstract idea, i.e., “crediting a 
merchant’s account as early as possible while electronically processing 
a check.”94 According to the court, the “basic steps of electronic check 
processing” were well known and fall under the rubric of the court’s 
prior decisions that find certain “transaction claims” performed in a 
particular order or sequence are directed to an abstract idea.95 The court 
explained this was not a situation where the claims were directed to a 
specific improvement in the way computers operate, noting counsel at 
oral argument agreed that the patent’s invention “did not improve the 
technical capture of information from a check to create a digital file or 
the technical step of electronically crediting a bank account.”96 
Holding that the claims directed to an abstract idea, the court 
turned to step two of the Alice/Mayo inquiry. There, the court 
concluded the claims did not contain an inventive concept to make 
them patent eligible.97 In the court’s view, the claims instructed a user 
to practice the abstract idea of electronic check processing in a routine 
and conventional way.98 
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co.,99 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision finding the challenged 
claims patent eligible under § 101.100 The claims recited a method for 
wirelessly communicating information about the status of a movable 
barrier, like a garage door.101 Applying the two-step framework of 
Alice/Mayo, the Federal Circuit first held the claims covered 
 
alternative, that even if directed to an abstract idea, the claims nevertheless recite an 
inventive concept under step two of Alice. See id. 
 93. Id. at 1164. 
 94. Id. at 1166. 
 95. Id. at 1166–67 (highlighting Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 
(Fed. Cir. 2014), among others). 
 96. Id. at 1167. 
 97. Id. at 1168–69. 
 98. Id. at 1169. 
 99. 935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 100. Id. at 1344–45. 
 101. Id. at 1345. 
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“communicating information wirelessly,” which, “without more, is 
[only] an abstract idea.”102 The court analogized these claims to those 
found directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, e.g., those that cover 
wirelessly communicating regional broadcast content or delivering 
user-content to a device.103 And the court distinguished the claims from 
claims that recite a specific manner of performing the abstract idea.104 
Because the claims covered an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the second step. At step two, the court held the claims did 
not recite an inventive concept to render them patent eligible.105 The 
court reasoned that the claims only covered conventional components, 
for example, a controller, interface, and wireless data transmitter, 
recited in a generic way, to achieve the abstract idea of wirelessly 
communicating information.106 Without more, the claims were held 
ineligible for patent protection.107 
In Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,108 the 
Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s holding that a patent 
claiming a method of using oxymorphone to treat pain in patients with 
renal impairment was patent ineligible under § 101.109 According to the 
district court, the claims were directed to an abstract idea—that is, “the 
bioavailability of oxymorphone is increased in people with severe renal 
impairment.”110 The district court then concluded that the “providing,” 
“measuring,” and “administering” steps recited in the claims were 
insufficient to provide an inventive concept and save the claims.111 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.112 Applying step one of the 
Alice/Mayo inquiry, the court concluded that the claims were not 
directed to an abstract idea.113 Contrary to the district court’s 
characterization of the claims, the Federal Circuit reasoned they did 
 
 102. Id. at 1347. 
 103. Id. (comparing to Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), and Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 104. Id. at 1347–48. 
 105. Id. at 1348–49. 
 106. Id. at 1348. 
 107. Id. at 1349. 
 108. 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1351. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1357. 
 113. Id. at 1353. 
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not only disclose the natural relationship between oxymorphone and 
patients with renal impairment, but rather they specifically captured a 
new application of that relationship for treatment, including with 
specific steps to adjust dosages.114 In the court’s view, the claims were 
directed to the “patent-eligible method of using oxymorphone or a 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof to treat pain in a renally 
impaired patient.”115 The court reasoned that these claims were 
indistinguishable from the “method of treatment” claims held patent 
eligible in Vanda Pharmaceuticals, which covered a “specific method of 
treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific 
doses to achieve a specific outcome.”116 As the claims were not directed 
to an abstract idea (and thus patent eligible), the court did not address 
step two of the Alice/Mayo inquiry. 
In American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,117 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that claims 
directed to a method for manufacturing driveline propeller shafts were 
patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.118 Specifically, the patent 
claimed a method of manufacturing with liners that were designed to 
“attenuate vibrations transmitted through a shaft assembly.”119 There 
were three types of vibrations—bending mode, torsion mode, and shell 
mode—that operated at different frequencies.120 The prior art already 
disclosed that altering the mass and stiffness of liners would attenuate 
these vibrations, but the prior art methods were not suitable for 
attenuating two vibration modes at the same time.121 American Axle 
purported to invent a method for tuning liners that would attenuate 
two modes of vibration simultaneously; however, the claims and 
specification did not describe how to achieve such tuning.122 Instead, 
the patent described the structure of a “tuned” liner and described the 
tuned liner in terms of the type or degree of attenuation achieved with 
different vibration modes.123 
 
 114. Id. at 1353–54. 
 115. Id. at 1353. 
 116. Id. at 1355 (quoting Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 
F.3d 1117, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
 117. 939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 118. Id. at 1357–58. 
 119. Id. at 1358 (internal quotations omitted). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1359. 
 122. Id. at 1359–60. 
 123. Id. at 1360. 
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The district court and Federal Circuit agreed that the claims were 
directed to laws of nature, Hooke’s law124 and friction damping125 and 
that they only encouraged one skilled in the art to take routine, 
conventional steps to apply Hooke’s law to achieve the desired results 
of attenuating vibration modes, therefore lacking an inventive step.126 
Judge Dyk, writing for the majority, explained that even though “the 
system involved in the ‘911 patent is more complex than just a bare 
application of Hooke’s law,” it was not patent eligible because “[w]hat 
is missing is any physical structure or steps for achieving the claimed 
result . . . [and] [t]he focus of the claimed advance here is simply the 
concept of achieving that result, by whatever structures or steps 
happen to work.”127 
Judge Moore dissented, opining that “[t]he majority’s decision 
expands § 101 well beyond its statutory gate-keeping function.”128 Her 
view was that the majority did not properly apply Step 2 of the 
Alice/Mayo test and rejected the patent’s many potential “inventive 
concepts” in its analysis.129 She opined that issues concerning the 
patent’s description of the claimed process were issues of enablement, 
not patent eligibility.130 Judge Moore found the majority’s result-
oriented “validity goulash” concerning and stressed that § 101 should 
not be so “sweeping and manipulatable” as to invalidate claims under 
similar statutory standards and “convert traditional questions of fact 
(like undue experimentation) into legal ones.”131 
Finally, in ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of ChargePoint’s complaint 
because the claims were ineligible for patenting under § 101.133 The 
claimed technology generally related to charging stations for 
electronic vehicles, and ChargePoint’s patents were specifically 
 
 124. Hooke’s law is a natural law that “describes the relationship between an 
object’s mass, its stiffness, and the frequency at which the object vibrates.” Id. at 1360. 
 125. Friction damping occurs due to “the resistive friction and interaction of two 
surfaces that press against each other as a source of energy dissipation.” It is a well-
known phenomenon in the art. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1361–67. 
 127. Id. at 1366–67. 
 128. Id. at 1368 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 1370–74. 
 130. Id. at 1374. 
 131. Id. at 1375. 
 132. 920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 133. Id. at 763. 
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directed to connecting those charging stations to a “networked” 
infrastructure.134 According to ChargePoint, this “network connectivity 
allows the stations to be managed from a central location, allows 
drivers to locate charging stations in advance, and allows all users to 
interact intelligently with the electricity grid.”135 
Applying the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Federal 
Circuit held the claims, irrespective of whether they were apparatus or 
method claims, were directed to the abstract idea of “communication 
over a network for interacting with a device, [just] applied to the 
context of electric vehicle charging stations.”136 It explained the 
specification could generally aid this analysis, either to the extent claim 
construction might be needed or to analyze what the patent describes 
as the invention.137 Here, the court reasoned that the specification 
served to confirm that the claims covered no more than the abstract 
idea of “communication over a network for device interaction.”138 
At step two of the Alice/Mayo inquiry, the court determined that the 
claims did not recite an inventive concept to transform the abstract 
idea into eligible subject matter.139 The court noted ChargePoint’s 
argument that it had solved known problems in an unconventional way 
through its ability to turn on electric supply based on communications 
from a remote server; “network-controlled” charging system; and 
charger station receiving communications from a remote server.140 
But, in the court’s view, ChargePoint’s “alleged ‘inventive concept’ . . . 
is [simply] that the charging stations are network-controlled,” and such 
network control “is the abstract idea itself.”141 It could not supply an 
inventive concept sufficient to save the claims. As a result, the court 
concluded the claims recited an abstract-idea-based solution 
 
 134. Id. at 763–64. 
 135. Id. at 763. 
 136. Id. at 768; see also id. at 766–73 (“[W]hile the eight claims on appeal vary in some 
respects, they are all directed to the abstract idea of communication over a network for 
device interaction. Communication over a network for that purpose has been and 
continues to be a ‘building block of the modern economy.’” (citation omitted)). 
 137. Id. at 767. 
 138. Id. at 769. The court also expressed concern with the sheer breadth of the 
claims and their potential to preempt the use of any networked charging station. See, 
e.g., id. at 768–69. 
 139. Id. at 775. 
 140. Id. at 774. 
 141. Id. 
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implemented with generic technical components in a conventional 
way and were, thus, patent ineligible.142 
B.   Anticipation 
Several of the court’s cases involved an anticipation analysis. In 
ATEN International Co. v. Uniclass Technology Co.,143 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on 
anticipation.144 In the court’s view, substantial evidence did not 
support the jury verdict finding anticipation, and the district court 
erred in sustaining that verdict.145 
At trial, the defendant presented two different theories of 
anticipation relying on (1) an earlier patentee product and/or its user 
manual and (2) a Great Britain patent.146 The jury returned a verdict 
finding the claims anticipated, but it did not specify which prior art it 
relied upon.147 The district court declined to overturn the verdict, and 
the Federal Circuit reversed.148 
With regard to the earlier patentee product and/or user manual, 
the court held that the defendant failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that this prior art predated the patent.149 The 
undisputed critical date for the patent was July 24, 2006.150 Thus, the 
defendant had to prove the earlier patentee product and/or user 
manual was available prior to July 24, 2006. The court noted, however, 
that the only evidence submitted by the defendant was expert 
testimony showing that the product and/or user manual were available 
generally in 2006, without specifying the date or month.151 According 
to the court, this general proclamation of 2006, without more, was not 
substantial evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of 
anticipation, to the extent it relied upon this prior art theory.152 
With regard to the Great Britain patent, the court held that the 
defendant’s expert failed to opine on whether the reference disclosed 
 
 142. Id. at 774–75. 
 143. 932 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 144. Id. at 1364. 
 145. Id. at 1368. 
 146. Id. at 1367. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1366. 
 149. Id. at 1368–69. 
 150. Id. at 1368. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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one element in each of the asserted claims.153 And, as it could not 
identify any place in the three pages of the Great Britain patent 
provided in the joint appendix that met this element, the court held 
no record evidence established that the reference disclosed each and 
every limitation.154 Substantial evidence accordingly failed to support 
the jury’s verdict of anticipation, to the extent it relied upon this 
alternative prior art theory.155 
In SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,156 SRI International, Inc. 
(“SRI”) sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”) alleging infringement of two 
of its network surveillance patents.157 Cisco moved for summary 
judgment on several issues, including that the claims were anticipated 
by the EMERALD 1997 reference.158 The district court denied Cisco’s 
motion for summary judgment of anticipation, and it sua sponte 
granted summary judgment of no anticipation.159 Cisco appealed from 
the district court’s decisions at summary judgment, presenting the 
question whether the district court erred in concluding on summary 
judgment that the EMERALD 1997 reference did not disclose 
detection of any of the network traffic data categories recited in the 
claims.160 The Federal Circuit affirmed.161 The court found persuasive 
that the USPTO considered the EMERALD 1997 during prosecution 
and several reexamination proceedings, repeatedly rejecting it as an 
anticipating reference.162 And the court found persuasive that Cisco’s 
expert provided inconsistent testimony regarding the purported 
disclosure and was “based on [] multiple layers of supposition.”163 The 
court held in view of this record that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact, and summary judgment of no anticipation was proper.164 
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co., the jury found 
that the asserted claims were not anticipated.165 Techtronic Industries 
 
 153. Id. at 1368–69. 
 154. Id. at 1369. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 157. Id. at 1301. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1302. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1300. 
 162. Id. at 1301–02 n.2. 
 163. Id. at 1307 (alteration in original). 
 164. Id. at 1312. 
 165. 935 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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Co. (“TTI”) moved for judgment as a matter of law that the Weik 
reference anticipates.166 The district court denied TTI’s motion, 
concluding substantial evidence supported the jury’s no-anticipation 
verdict.167 The district court stated TTI’s anticipation theory required 
a combination of different embodiments in the same reference, and 
that such a theory was improper as a matter of law.168 TTI appealed from 
the decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.169 According to the court, 
although the district court erred in suggesting a blanket rule that two 
embodiments in a reference can never be considered in combination to 
find anticipation, the error was harmless under the circumstances 
because TTI (1) did not allege that the jury ever received such a 
recitation of the law and (2) did not appeal from the jury instructions.170 
It then concluded, “[b]ecause Weik’s disclosure as to the possible 
combinability of the embodiments in the way TTI urges is less than 
clear,” TTI failed to meet its burden of showing that the jury’s no-
anticipation verdict was not supported by substantial evidence.171 
In Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. International Trade Commission,172 
the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission 
(ITC) decision finding the asserted claims were not anticipated.173 
Aspen Aerogels, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging 
that Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. (“Alison”) violated section 337 of 
the Tariff Act by importing allegedly infringing aerogel insulation 
materials.174 Before the ITC, Alison argued that the claims were 
anticipated.175 The Commission rejected Alison’s challenge, finding 
 
 166. Id. at 1345. 
 167. Id. at 1344–45. 
 168. Id. at 1350. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. As the Court stated, 
a reference can anticipate a claim even if it do[es] not expressly spell out all 
the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the 
art, reading the reference, would at once envisage the claimed arrangement 
or combination. Thus, even when a reference discloses elements in different 
locations in the disclosure, the relevant question is whether the reference is 
sufficiently clear in disclosing the combinability of those elements such that a 
skilled artisan would at once envisage the claimed combination. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 171. Id. 
 172. 936 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 173. Id. at 1365. 
 174. Id. at 1356. 
 175. Id. 
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persuasive record evidence showing that the asserted reference was (1) 
identified and distinguished in the patent specification, (2) considered 
and distinguished by the examiner during prosecution because it 
lacked a “lofty . . . batting,” and (iii) rejected in an inter partes review 
for also failing to disclose “lofty . . . batting.”176 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.177 Alison argued that the 
reference inherently disclosed the “lofty . . . batting” claim element 
with its disclosure of “glass wool” because the glass wool demonstrated 
both the “bulk and resilience” properties and “low density and thermal 
characteristics” disclosed in the asserted patent’s specification.178 The 
court rejected this argument.179 It noted substantial evidence showed 
“glass wool” is not inherently lofty; these “bulk and resilience” properties 
were with respect to a composite, not any individual fibers, and expert 
testimony explained that “one cannot necessarily attribute the bulk and 
resilience of the composite to the fibers contained therein”; and both 
parties’ experts agreed low density alone does not inherently create 
“lofty” batting.180 The court further emphasized that the asserted patent 
not only identified, but clearly distinguished the reference, and the 
examiner and Patent Trial and Appeal Board both found this reference 
insufficient to disclose the “lofty . . . batting” element.181 
C.   Obviousness 
Not surprisingly, many of the Federal Circuit’s cases involved an 
obviousness analysis. While it is not possible to summarize every § 103 
decision, the following is a sample of the more interesting cases. 
In Forest Laboratories, LLC v. Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC, several 
defendants filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) seeking 
to market generic versions of Saphris, a drug product sold by Forest.182 
Forest sued for patent infringement.183 Following a bench trial, the 
district court concluded the asserted claims were not obvious.184 While 
it was undisputed that oral formulations of asenapine and sublingual 
 
 176. Id. at 1357–58. 
 177. Id. at 1365. 
 178. Id. at 1364. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1365 (“Arguments and references already considered by the Patent 
Office may carry less weight with the fact finder.” (citation omitted)). 
 182. 918 F.3d 928, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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formulations of other drugs were known in the art, the district court 
found that there was not a motivation to develop a sublingual or a 
buccal formulation of asenapine.185 The district court also found the 
resolution of cardiotoxic effects by sublingual administration was an 
unexpected result, and sublingual administration met the long-felt 
need for a safe, effective, and tolerable atypical antipsychotic to treat 
schizophrenia and mania.186 In the district court’s opinion, these 
indicia weighed in favor of concluding the claims were nonobvious.187 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded.188 The court 
generally agreed with the district court’s consideration, and dismissal, 
of several theories that defendants-appellants proposed for a 
motivation to combine, including dismissal of the notion that a desire 
to have multiple treatment options generally available would provide 
motivation to pursue a specific combination of the prior art 
elements.189 And, it found no error in the district court reasoning that 
the inventors had discovered an unknown problem in the art, 
suggesting their solution to that problem might not have been obvious 
“because ordinary artisans would not have thought to try at all because 
they would not have recognized the problem.”190 The court 
nevertheless remanded because the district court failed to make any 
express finding whether a compliance concern for patients with 
trouble swallowing would provide sufficient motivation to combine the 
prior art elements.191 
In Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc.,192 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the sole claim 
asserted in one patent did not lack written description support and 
 
 185. Id. at 933–34. 
 186. Id. at 934. 
 187. Id. at 933–34. 
 188. Id. at 938. 
 189. Id. at 935. 
 190. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 191. Id. at 936. The Court also held the district did not clearly err in finding the 
evidence of long-felt need weighed in favor of nonobviousness but held the district 
court did err in its analysis of unexpected results. Id. at 937 (“[A] person of ordinary 
skill could not have been surprised that the sublingual route of administration did not 
result in cardiotoxic effects because the person of ordinary skill would not have been 
aware that other routes of administration do result in cardiotoxic effects.”). 
 192. 934 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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reversed the decision that the asserted claims of the other two patents 
would not have been obvious.193 
Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Nalpropion”) markets Contrave®, a 
drug used for weight management in overweight or obese adults.194 
Nalpropion listed three patents in the Orange Book covering Contrave®, 
and it asserted those three patents against Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc. 
(“Actavis”) after Actavis filed an ANDA seeking to enter the market with a 
generic version.195 Actavis contended that the claims of two of the three 
patents would have been obvious.196 It argued that it would have been 
obvious for the skilled artisan to combine bupropion and naltrexone for 
treating overweight obesity because both drugs were known to cause weight 
loss.197 The district court disagreed, and found Actavis’s argument to 
simply be “a classic case of hindsight bias.”198 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed on the issue of 
obviousness.199 It held that the asserted prior art taught bupropion 
causes weight loss.200 For example, one reference taught that a 
“sustained release bupropion was ‘an effective adjunct to diet for 
weight loss in both non-depressed and depressed patients.’”201 And, it 
held that the record also shows that naltrexone can cause weight loss.202 
For example, it found that one reference taught “naltrexone or similar 
drugs may have a role in the clinical treatment of obesity.”203 Given that 
both drugs had shown known weight loss effect, the court reasoned 
that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine them.204 
Nalpropion argued the skilled artisan would nevertheless be 
dissuaded from combining these drugs because (1) bupropion had a 
largely insignificant effect on weight loss and thus failed to obtain FDA 
approval as a weight loss drug, (2) bupropion carried a seizure risk, 
and (3) bupropion’s mechanism of action was unknown.205 The court 
 
 193. Id. at 1356. 
 194. Id. at 1346. 
 195. Id. at 1346, 1348. 
 196. Id. at 1348. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1351–56. 
 200. Id. at 1353. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. Id. at 1354–55. 
 205. Id. at 1354. 
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rejected these contentions.206 It reiterated that motivation to combine 
can come from a variety of places, and “[t]here is no requirement in 
patent law that the person of ordinary skill be motivated to develop the 
claimed invention based on a rationale that forms the basis for FDA 
approval.”207 It then stated that the “persons of skill did combine the two 
drugs even without understanding bupropion’s mechanism of action but 
with an understanding that bupropion was well-tolerated and safe as an 
antidepressant,” and that was enough for the court to find a motivation to 
combine.208 After noting a motivation to combine the art, the court held 
that the prior art sufficiently disclosed the claim limitations, and that 
Nalpropion failed to submit persuasive secondary indicia.209 The 
challenged claims were accordingly held invalid as obvious.210 
In another ANDA case,211 the asserted patent licensed by Endo 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Endo”) covered a process for producing 
morphinan alkaloid compounds, like oxymorphone, which are 
beneficial for pain relief.212 The patent discussed processes for 
preparing pure morphinan-6-one products having a low concentration 
of impurities—known as α,β-unsaturated ketone intermediate 
compounds (“ABUKs”)—by treating a mixture including morphinan-6-
one and an ABUK with a sulfur containing compound.213 The FDA 
mandated opioid manufacturers reduce ABUK impurities in oxycodone 
and oxymorphone to below 0.001%.214 The asserted patent disclosed 
this solution and claimed “a hydrochloride salt of oxymorphone 
comprising less than 0.001% of 14-hydroxymorphinone.”215 
The district court held that the asserted claims would not have been 
obvious in view of a combination of three references.216 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a skilled artisan would not 
have a reasonable expectation of success in combining the prior art 
because each had its own respective failures.217 First, the court noted 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1354 (quoting Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 208. Id. at 1354–55. 
 209. Id. at 1355–56. 
 210. Id. at 1356. 
 211. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis LLC, 922 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 212. Id. at 1367. 
 213. Id. at 1368. 
 214. Id. at 1373 n.9. 
 215. Id. at 1368. 
 216. Id. at 1369. 
 217. Id. at 1372–78. 
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that the skilled artisan would not reasonably expect to successfully 
employ one reference’s “catalytic hydrogenation process for 
oxymorphone” with another’s “process to remove diol during 
hydrogenation,” as the reference did not provide key reaction 
conditions and its process produced an undesirable product that 
would “frustrate purification.”218 Second, the court noted that another 
reference disclosed a process that likewise produced a product that 
would “hinder purification,” which is a necessary feature of the claimed 
invention.219 And third, the court noted that the last of the three 
references failed to disclose a purifying process that led to the purity 
levels recited in the claims.220 In the court’s view, these references 
failed to equip the skilled artisan with the reasonable expectation that 
it could successfully combine their disclosures to achieve the claimed 
invention.221 The court last considered the FDA’s mandate, which 
identified market incentives for achieving the claimed purity level but 
concluded it could not provide a skilled artisan with a reasonable 
expectation of success to overcome the three references because it 
simply “recite[d] a goal without teaching how the goal is attained.”222 
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 
International Ltd.,223 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
determination that the challenged claims were nonobvious.224 The 
challenged patent claims using “everolimus” to treat advanced renal 
cell carcinoma (“RCC”) by inhibiting the growth of any RCC tumors.225 
Everolimus is the active ingredient in Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.’s 
(“Novartis”) Affinitor product.226 West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 
 
 218. Id. at 1374. 
 219. Id. at 1375. 
 220. Id. at 1376. 
 221. Id. at 1374–76. 
 222. Id. at 1376; e.g., id. at 1376–78. In Judge Stoll’s dissenting opinion, the FDA 
mandate disclosed the limitations of claim 1 and was the only reference to disclose the 
limitation prior to the invention at issue. Id. at 1378 (Stoll, J., dissenting). Judge Stoll 
accordingly believed the district court and panel majority erred in finding it lacked 
“anything substantive relevant to obviousness.” Id. at 1378–79. Judge Stoll also opined 
that the district court committed legal error by “elevating the reasonable expectation 
of success standard to require that prior art provide a definitive solution to the 
problem and proof of actual success,” and by “conflating the requirements of 
reasonable expectation of success and motivation to combine.” Id. at 1379–80. 
 223. 923 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 224. Id. at 1053. 
 225. Id. at 1053–54. 
 226. Id. at 1053. 
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International Ltd. (“West-Ward”) filed an ANDA seeking to make a 
generic version of Affinitor.227 
Before the district court, West-Ward argued the asserted claims were 
obvious because the ordinary artisan would have been motivated based 
on a combination of prior art references to use everolimus to treat 
advanced RCC.228 In particular, it relied on references that showed that 
(1) compounds called mTOR inhibitor produced effects, such as 
inhibition of hypoxia-inducible factor 1, that were hypothesized to 
inhibit tumor growth; (2) everolimus was a type of mTOR inhibitor; 
and (3) temsirolimus, another mTOR inhibitor, had shown responses 
in RCC patients in Phase I clinical trials.229 West-Ward then argued 
that, based on the Phase I clinical trials and the knowledge of the 
skilled artisan about the molecular biology of advance RCC, antitumor 
activity of mTOR inhibitor, and safe dosing ranges for everolimus, that 
skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in 
doing so.230 The district court rejected these contentions and found 
West-Ward failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a skilled 
artisan would have been motivated to combine references and select 
everolimus for treatment with a reasonable expectation of success.231 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted the district court erred in its 
analysis of a motivation to combine but nevertheless affirmed because 
it agreed West-Ward failed to meet its burden to establish a reasonable 
expectation of success.232 
With regard to the motivation to combine, the court faulted the 
district court for applying too high of a standard—instead of requiring 
West-Ward to prove that a skilled artisan would have been motivated 
to select everolimus, it was enough to show the prior art teachings led 
a skilled artisan to pursue everolimus as one of several methods to treat 
solid tumors, including advanced RCC.233 With regard to expectation 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1057. 
 229. Id. at 1053–54. 
 230. Id. at 1057. 
 231. Id. at 1057–58. 
 232. Id. at 1059. 
 233. Id. at 1059–60 (“The proper inquiry is whether a person of ordinary skill would 
have been motivated to modify the prior art disclosing use of temsirolimus to treat 
advanced RCC with the prior art disclosing everolimus. This question was answered 
affirmatively when the district court found that a person of ordinary skill ‘would have 
been motivated to pursue everolimus as one of several potential treatment options for 
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of success, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s factual 
findings.234 It noted that West-Ward’s reliance on the success of Phase 
I clinical results for temsirolimus was misplaced because those trial 
results came from studies designed to test safety, not efficacy, and 
Phase II clinical trials have a high rate of failure for anti-cancer drugs 
generally.235 It also noted that evidence showed that the molecular 
biology of advanced RCC was not fully understood at the time, and that 
pharmacological differences in mTOR inhibitors (including everolimus 
and temsirolimus) would not have led the skilled artisan to reasonably 
expect they would have similar antitumor efficacy.236 
Finally, in Grunenthal GmbH v. Alkem Laboratories Ltd.,237 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination the asserted claims 
were nonobvious.238 Grunenthal GmbH (“Grunenthal”) was the assignee 
of two patents listed in the Orange Book with Grunenthal’s NUCYNTA® 
ER tablet.239 The first patent was related to the Form A polymorph, and 
its claims recited X-ray powder diffraction patterns.240 The second was for 
a method of using tapentadol and tapentadol hydrochloride for the 
treatment of polyneuropathic pain.241 Grunenthal sued several 
defendants seeking to market a generic version of its tapentadol 
product.242 Before the district court, these defendants asserted, among 
other things, the patents were invalid as obvious.243 The district court 
disagreed and confirmed the validity of the patents.244 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that defendants 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the skilled artisan 
would have had a reasonable expectation of success producing the 
claimed Form A polymorph from an existing Form B, using methods 
described in the prior art.245 The court noted the polymorphism of 
 
advanced solid tumors, including advanced RCC.’” (quoting Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. 
West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 287 F. Supp. 3d 505, 516 (D. Del. 2017)). 
 234. Id. at 1060–62. 
 235. Id. at 1061. 
 236. Id. at 1061–62. 
 237. 919 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 238. Id. at 1336. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1337–38. 
 243. Id. at 1338. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1341–45. 
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tapentadol chloride was unknown, and that polymorphism does not 
occur in all compounds.246 The court indicated the prior art relied upon 
at best presented a flow chart with a number of variables that could be 
adjusted to assess if polymorphism would occur, but failed to indicate 
when any solvents or mixtures should be used, and failed to provide 
guidelines regarding which variables (such as temperature, pH, 
agitation) would be more likely to result in a polymorph for a 
particular compound.247 In the court’s view, this prior art reference 
suggested the skilled artisan could manipulate a number of variables 
and ultimately fail to find a polymorph; it did not offer a reasonable 
expectation of successfully generating a Form A polymorph.248 The 
court noted that defendants also argued the district court applied the 
wrong standard, requiring “absolute predictability” rather than a 
reasonable expectation of success.249 The court rejected this and 
explained that, in this case, a skilled artisan would have had no reason to 
know that Form B is a polymorph, nor would the skilled artisan have 
known how the multiple variables at play would impact the analysis—the 
evidence of record precluded even a reasonable expectation of success.250 
Last, defendants argued it would have been obvious to try as the 
prior art discloses but a finite number of solvents to use.251 The court 
rejected this argument as well.252 It reiterated for obvious to try, a 
defendant must establish (1) a design or market need to solve a 
problem and (2) that there are a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions.253 And, based on its review of the art, it 
concluded the prior art disclosed “a huge number of possible choices,” 
not a finite number.254 According to the court, it would not have been 





 246. Id. at 1341. 
 247. Id. at 1342–43. 
 248. Id. at 1341–43. 
 249. Id. at 1343. 
 250. Id. at 1343–45. 
 251. Id. at 1345. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
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D.   Indefiniteness 
In Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. International Trade Commission,256 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed an ITC decision finding that asserted claims were 
not invalid as indefinite because, although the claims included a term of 
degree, namely, “lofty . . . batting,” the specification adequately explained 
the objective boundaries of the term’s scope with reasonable certainty.257 
Aspen Aerogels, Inc. had filed a complaint with the Commission 
alleging that Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. (“Alison”) violated 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930258 by importing alleging infringing 
aerogel insulation materials.259 Before the ITC, Alison argued that the 
claims were invalid for indefiniteness.260 The Commission rejected this 
argument and adopted the express definition in the specification that 
“lofty . . . batting” was “[a] fibrous material that shows the properties 
of bulk and some resilience (with or without full recovery).”261 The 
Commission emphasized the “bulk” and “resilience” components of 
the definition are set forth in detail in the specification and provide 
sufficient metes and bounds for the claim phrase.262 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.263 In the court’s view, Alison 
sought “a level of ‘mathematical precision’ beyond what the law 
requires.”264 It noted the specification provided express definitions for 
the term “lofty . . . batting” and its components.265 In particular, it 
explained that “lofty batting” was defined as “[a] fibrous material that 
shows the properties of bulk and some resilience (with or without full 
recovery),” and the specification further provided “bulk” refers to “air 
or openness created by the web of fibers in a lofty batting” and 
“sufficiently resilient” indicated it “can be compressed to remove the 
air (bulk) yet spring back to substantially its original size and shape.”266 
 
 256. 936 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 257. Id. at 1356, 1360. 
 258. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
 259. Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co., 936 F.3d at 1356. 
 260. Id. at 1357. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. (“In particular, the ALJ pointed to the specification’s disclosure that bulk 
is ‘air’ and that a lofty batting is ‘sufficiently resilient’ if ‘after compression for a few 
seconds it will return to at least 70% of its original thickness.’” (citations omitted)). 
 263. Id. at 1359. 
 264. Id. at 1360 (quoting Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
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The court also noted that the patent specification detailed “functional 
characteristics” of a “lofty . . . batting” and had numerous “examples 
and metrics that further inform the meaning.”267 According to the 
court, this was sufficient support to conclude the term of degree was 
not indefinite.268 It nevertheless noted that its understanding was 
further supported by the prosecution history, where the examiner 
“emphasized” the specification defined “lofty . . . batting,” and the 
term offered a means for distinguishing the claims over the prior art.269 
In HZPN Medicines LLC v. Actavis Laboratories UT, Inc.,270 HZNP 
Medicines LLC (“Horizon”) was the assignee of several patents relating 
to methods and compositions for treating osteoarthritis.271 The patents 
were listed in the Orange Book for Horizon’s PENNSAID®2% product 
for the treatment of osteoarthritis in the knee.272 Actavis Laboratories 
UT, Inc. (“Actavis”) sought to market a generic version and filed an 
ANDA.273 Horizon sued Actavis for patent infringement.274 
Before the district court, Actavis challenged the patents, alleging 
among other things, the claims were indefinite.275 The district court 
agreed and found several terms indefinite, including (1) “the topical 
formulation produces less than 0.1% impurity A after 6 months at 25°C 
and 60% humidity” because “impurity A” is not knowable, (2) “the 
formulation degrades by less than 1% over 6 months” as neither the 
specification nor claims offered a means to evaluate the degradation, 
and (3) “consisting essentially of.”276 As to the latter, the district court 
reasoned that because the parties disputed the basic and novel 
properties that could not be affected by unlisted claim elements, any 
lack of informative disclosure as to the scope of those properties 
rendered the claims indefinite.277 For example, because “better drying 
 
 267. Id. at 1361. 
 268. Id. at 1362. 
 269. Id. at 1361. 
 270. 940 F.3d 680 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 271. Id. at 683. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 684. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 684–85 (“The district court therefore concluded that ‘[b]ecause the basic 
and novel properties of an invention are part of the construction of a claim containing 
the phrase “consisting essentially of,” the Nautilus standard applies to the assessment 
of an invention’s basic and novel properties.’” (citation omitted)). 
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time” was one basic and novel property, the district court reasoned that 
the identification of inconsistent methods in the specification for 
evaluating “better drying time” rendered these claims indefinite.278 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.279 First, the court addressed 
whether “impurity A” was indefinite and concluded it was.280 The court 
noted “impurity A” only appeared in the claim and in one example in 
the specification.281 In the court’s view, the claim did not indicate the 
identity of “impurity A,” as it recited the entire topical formulation 
having a number of excipients and it was unclear if “impurity A” would 
be a specific impurity.282 In turning to the specification, the court 
noted it did not “expressly” identify what “impurity A” was.283 And, last, 
in the court’s view, the extrinsic evidence failed to establish that a 
skilled artisan would know what “impurity A” was based on limited 
testing parameters recited in the specification.284 
Second, the court addressed whether “degrades” was indefinite and 
held that it was.285 The court noted the proposed construction for 
“degrades” was “[l]ess than 1% of Impurity A” and thus relied on an 
understanding of “impurity A.”286 It accordingly reasoned, “[s]ince 
‘impurity A,’ is indefinite, it logically follows that another term, such 
as the ‘degrades’ term, which [in turn] relies on ‘impurity A’ for its 
construction, must also be indefinite.”287 
Last, the court addressed whether “consisting essentially of” in this 
context is indefinite and concluded it was.288 The court noted the 
known principle invoked by using “consisting essentially of” in a claim, 
namely, that the phrase permits inclusion of components not listed in 
the claim, provided they do not “materially affect the basic and novel 
properties of the invention.”289 It then remarked: 
 
 
 278. Id. at 685. 
 279. Id. at 688. 
 280. Id. at 688–89. 
 281. Id. at 688. 
 282. Id. at 690. 
 283. Id. at 690–91. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 691–92. 
 286. Id. at 692. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 692–99. 
 289. Id. at 693. 
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By using the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ in the claims, the 
inventor in this case incorporated into the scope of the claims an 
evaluation of the basic and novel properties. The use of ‘consisting 
essentially of’ implicates not only the items [expressly] listed after 
the phrase, but also those steps (in a process claim) or [the] 
ingredients (in a composition claim) that do not materially affect 
the basic and novel properties of the invention.290 
Thus, in the court’s view, assessing these properties and their 
associated disclosure was proper.291 
Turning to the specification, the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court correctly identified basic and novel properties, including 
a “better drying time,” and did not err in finding the specification 
failed to inform the skilled artisan as to the scope of a “better drying 
time.”292 In particular, the court agreed with the district court that the 
specification disclosed two different inconsistent ways for determining 
“better drying time”: an in vitro method and an in vivo method.293 
Accordingly, the court held that the “consisting essentially of” 
limitation was invalid for indefiniteness.294 
E.   Written Description and Enablement 
There were several cases dealing with § 112 issues.295 In CenTrak, Inc. v. 
Sonitor Technologies, Inc.,296 the dispute was over infringement of a patent 
for a real-time location system allowing users to identify portable devices 
in a facility. The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment that the claims were invalid for a lack of 
written description support.297 According to the court, genuine issues of 
material fact that precluded summary judgment remained.298 
The asserted claims recited, among other things, (1) ultrasonic base 
stations, (2) portable devices, (3) a server, (4) radio frequency base 
 
 290. Id. at 693–94. 
 291. Id. at 696. 
 292. Id. at 693, 696–99. 
 293. Id. at 696–99. 
 294. Id. But see id. at 704, 706 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“It is hard to imagine a clearer statement than a list of the ingredients that the 
claimed formulation ‘consists essentially of.’”). 
 295. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (codifying specification requirements for 
patent applications). 
 296. 915 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 297. Id. at 1362. 
 298. Id. 
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stations, and (5) a backbone that connects the server with the RF base 
stations.299 Although all of the claims recited ultrasonic components, 
the court explained that a “vast majority of the specification focuses on 
infrared (IR) or RF components.”300 Before the district court, the 
defendant argued the only two sentences in the specification noting 
ultrasound failed to show the inventors had possession of an 
ultrasound-based system.301 The district court agreed and granted 
summary judgment that the claims did not satisfy the written 
description requirement.302 It reasoned that, although the 
specification “contemplated” ultrasound, that was not sufficient.303 It 
explained “electromagnetic radiation and sound waves are not simply 
two species of the same genus”; they are “different types of 
phenomena” and one could not drop the ultrasonic transmitter into 
an IR system disclosed in the specification.304 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.305 It explained that just 
because the specification might focus on one embodiment, here an IR 
system, that does not mean another embodiment is not contemplated 
or sufficiently disclosed.306 Quantity is not an exclusive metric.307 As the 
court noted, the specification, albeit brief, disclosed an ultrasonic 
embodiment.308 Whether it was sufficient for written description 
purposes depended on “the nature and scope of the claims and on the 
complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.”309 As the 
district court failed to consider factual questions regarding the 
complexity and predictability of ultrasonic systems, including 
testimony suggesting the differences between IR and ultrasound were 
incidental to carrying out the claimed invention, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s award of summary judgment.310 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 1363. 
 301. Id. at 1364. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 1365 (quoting CenTrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-183-RGA, 
2017 WL 3730617, at *8 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2017)). 
 305. Id. at 1373–74. 
 306. Id. at 1366. 
 307. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he fact that the bulk of the specification discusses a system 
with infrared components does not necessarily mean that the inventors did not also 
constructively reduce to practice a system with ultrasonic components.”). 
 308. Id. at 1367. 
 309. Id. (quoting Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 310. Id. at 1367–68. 
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In In re Global IP Holdings LLC,311 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the case because the PTAB applied the wrong written 
description standard.312 Global IP Holdings LLC (“Global”) filed a 
reissue application to broaden its claims that were directed to carpeted 
automotive vehicle load floors.313 That reissue application replaced the 
term “thermoplastic” with “plastic” in several independent claims, and 
the inventor filed a declaration explaining, among other things, that 
he was aware of using plastics other than thermoplastics.314 The examiner 
rejected the proposed reissue claims for failing to comply with the written 
description requirement.315 In particular, he reasoned that the 
specification only described components formed from thermoplastic 
materials, not generally from plastic materials.316 Global appealed to the 
PTAB, and the PTAB affirmed.317 The PTAB explained “regardless of the 
predictability of results of substituting alternatives, or the actual criticality of 
thermoplastics in the overall invention, [Global’s] Specification, as a whole, 
indicates to one skilled in the art that the inventors had possession only 
of the skins and core comprising specifically thermoplastic.”318 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded.319 The court 
held the PTAB erred in its written description analysis.320 It explained 
that the Board’s statement of “regardless of the predictability of results of 
substituting alternatives” conflicted with precedent.321 A written 
description inquiry will vary depending on the nature and scope of the 
claims, as well as “on the complexity and predictability of the relevant 
technology.”322 The predictability of substituting generic plastics for 
thermoplastics was the very question the PTAB was asked to resolve.323 
Similarly, the court noted that “criticality or importance of an unclaimed 
 
 311. 927 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 312. Id. at 1374. 
 313. Id. at 1375. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 1376. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. (emphases added) (quoting Ex Parte Preisler, No. 2018-000871, 2017 WL 
6882664, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2017)). 
 319. Id. at 1374. 
 320. Id. at 1377. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See id. 
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limitation to the invention” is relevant to the written description inquiry 
and that the PTAB erred by failing to consider it.324 
In Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,325 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that challenged claims 
from two patents were invalid for lack of enablement.326 The claims from 
one asserted patent were directed to nonradioactive labeling of 
polynucleotides, where the label was attached at the phosphate position 
of a nucleotide.327 They did not cover specific polynucleotides, “nor [did] 
they focus on the chemistry or linker used to attach a label, the number 
of labels to attach to a polynucleotide, or where within the polynucleotide 
to attach those labels.”328 According to the court, the “scope of the claims 
is quite broad.”329 The claims from the other asserted patent related to 
either in situ hybridization or liquid phase hybridization and were 
similarly broad.330 The two patents shared a common specification.331 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims were not 
enabled.332 According to the court, even if it were to assume the 
specification taught a skilled artisan how to make the broad range of 
labeled polynucleotides contemplated by the claims, it still failed to teach 
a skilled artisan “which combinations will produce a polynucleotide 
that is [both] hybridizable and detectable upon hybridization.”333 The 
court indicated that “[g]iven the unpredictability of the art at the 
time . . . , merely stating that a labeled polynucleotide will work as a 
probe is not sufficient to enable [a skilled artisan] to know that it would 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 326. Id. at 1342. 
 327. Id. at 1343. 
 328. Id. at 1343, 1346–47 (explaining “[c]laim 1 of the ‘180 patent encompasses all 
phosphate-labeled polynucleotides that are hybridizable and detectable. The claim 
places almost no limitations on the structure of the claimed polynucleotide, other than 
the fact that the label is attached to the phosphate portion of the nucleotide. It does 
not restrict the chemistry used to attach the label, the chemical linker used, the 
number of labels within a probe, or the location of the labels on the probe (i.e., 
whether they are terminal or internal). As to the type of non-radioactive label used, 
the claim provides broad categories . . . .”). 
 329. Id. at 1346. 
 330. Id. at 1344; see also id. at 1349 (“Those claims are broader than the asserted 
claims of the ‘180 patent; rather than covering only phosphate-labeled 
polynucleotides, they also cover labeling at other locations on a nucleotide.”). 
 331. Id. at 1343. 
 332. Id. at 1349. 
 333. Id. at 1346. 
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indeed function as a probe—i.e., be hybridizable and detectable upon 
hybridization.”334 In the court’s view, it would have required undue 
experimentation to determine if the embodiments of the broad claims 
would exhibit this required functionality.335 
In Quake v. Lo,336 the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s 
determination that the involved claims were unpatentable for lack of 
written description.337 The claims generally covered a method of 
determining the presence of a chromosomal abnormality in fetuses 
using massively parallel sequencing (MPS) technology to sequence DNA 
fragments from a sample of the mother’s blood that contains both 
maternal and fetal DNA.338 The claims specifically recited random MPS 
methods, but the specification recited detection of target sequences.339 
The PTAB determined the specification failed to provide support 
for the claimed random MPS method, and the Federal Circuit agreed.340 
The court reasoned that the MPS method was not “expressly described” 
in the specification, noting that (1) the specification does not recite 
“random MPS,” (2) the process of amplifying DNA in any sample before 
sequencing is not described, as would be needed if a random MPS method 
was contemplated, and (3) even the patentee admitted no embodiment 
describes the statistical analysis needed to determine data generated from 
a random MPS method.341 The court then noted, although the MPS 
method may be implicitly contemplated in two isolated locations, the 
“repeated discussion of targeted sequencing,” when contrasted with the 
bare invocation of the MPS method, was insufficient for written description 
purposes.342 As the court highlighted, “in the context of this patent,” the 
two isolated statements were “a highly elliptical cryptic way to communicate 
possession of a second method,” i.e., the MPS method.343 
In Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the sole claim 
asserted in one patent did not lack written description support and 
 
 334. Id. at 1347. 
 335. Id. at 1349. 
 336. 928 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 337. Id. at 1367. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 1374. 
 342. Id. at 1376. 
 343. Id. 
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reversed the decision that the claims of the other patent would not 
have been obvious.344 
Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Nalpropion”) markets 
Contrave®, a drug used for weight management in overweight or 
obese adults.345 Nalpropion listed three patents in the Orange Book 
covering Contrave®, and it asserted those three patents against Actavis 
Laboratories FL, Inc. (“Actavis”) after Actavis filed an ANDA seeking to 
enter the market with a generic version.346 Actavis asserted the claim in 
one patent was invalid for lack of written description.347 It argued that 
the claimed dissolution profile was achieved using the “USP Apparatus 
2 Paddle Method,” but the specification disclosed data obtained using the 
“USP Apparatus 1 Basket Method.”348 The district court was not 
persuaded that use of a different method from what is in the claim 
presented a written description problem, stating “whether the dissolution 
data reported in the specification was obtained using the basket method 
or the paddle method is not relevant to whether the inventors had 
possession of the invention.”349 The district court credited Nalpropion’s 
expert, who opined a skilled artisan would have recognized the inventors 
possessed the invention, irrespective whether the paddle method or a 
“‘substantially equivalent method’ was used.”350 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.351 The court reiterated the 
test for sufficiency of a written description is “whether the disclosure 
of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in 
the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter,” and 
“[i]t is not necessary that the exact terms of a claim be used in haec 
verba in the specification, and equivalent language may be 
sufficient.”352 In the court’s view, the district court “performed 
precisely its fact-finding function” and made credibility determinations 
on each expert’s opinions regarding the “substantial equivalence” of 
 
 344. 934 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 1346, 1348. 
 347. Id. at 1348. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. (quoting Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. v. Actavis Labs. FL, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 
3d 793, 802 (D. Del. 2017)). 
 350. Id. (quoting Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 801). 
 351. Id. at 1351. 
 352. Id. at 1350 (quoting Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
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the paddle and the basket methods.353 Declining to disturb that finding 
on appeal, the court agreed with the district court’s finding that the 
two tables and data in the specification adequately showed the 
inventors possessed their invention.354 It then concluded: 
While as a general matter written description may not be satisfied by 
so-called equivalent disclosure, in this case, buttressed by the district 
court’s fact-finding, and where the so-called equivalence relates only 
to resultant dissolution parameters rather than operative claim 
steps, we affirm the district court’s conclusion. Rigidity should yield 
to flexible, sensible interpretation.355 
In Nuvo Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories, Inc.,356 an ANDA case, the generic drug manufacturer 
defendants appealed from the district court’s decision confirming 
claims as adequately described under § 112.357 The claims related to a 
pain medication that included a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug 
and an acid inhibitor, such as a proton pump inhibitor (“PPI”).358 
Notably, the claims recited an uncoated PPI that was effective to raise 
gastric pH levels.359 
Before the district court, the generic drug manufacturer defendants 
argued that if they lost on the obviousness theory that a skilled artisan 
would have known and/or expected uncoated PPI to be effective to 
raise gastric pH levels, then the asserted claims necessarily lacked written 
description support because the specification failed to include 
experimental data or analytical reasoning to show actual possession of 
the claimed invention.360 The district court disagreed, finding the claims 
adequately described.361 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.362 
 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 1351. 
 355. Id. Dissenting in part from the panel decision on written description, Chief 
Judge Prost maintained that the panel majority had introduced a new rule, whereby 
“substantially equivalent” disclosure may satisfy the written description requirement, 
in direct contravention of the Court’s precedent. Id. at 1356 (Prost, C.J., dissenting in 
part). But even assuming that were the standard, she also found that the district court 
clearly erred in finding the patent specification includes some “substantially 
equivalent” disclosure to the claimed paddle method. See id. at 1356, 1358–59. 
 356. 923 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 357. Id. at 1371. 
 358. Id. at 1372. 
 359. Id. at 1377. 
 360. Id. at 1375. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 1384. 
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While the patents claimed uncoated PPI effective to raise gastric pH 
levels to at least 3.5, the court found persuasive the fact that the prior art 
taught away from such effectiveness.363 In such a circumstance, the court 
reasoned that it was fatal for the specification to lack “experimental data, 
or some reason, theory, or alternative explanation” showing the 
inventor possessed the patented treatment.364 
In Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc.,365 Idenix 
Pharmaceuticals appealed the District of Delaware’s judgment as a 
matter of law finding that Idenix’s patent was invalid for lack of 
enablement, and Gilead Sciences further argued that the patent was 
invalid for lack of written description.366 The court affirmed the district 
court’s decision on enablement and further sided with Gilead on the 
written description issue.367 Idenix’s patent was directed to a method 
of treatment for hepatitis C virus by administering nucleoside 
compounds having a specific chemical and stereochemical structure: 
(1) a sugar ring with five carbon atoms to which different atoms or 
groups of atoms can be attached in either up or down positions and 
(2) various possible 2’-methyl-up nucleosides (methyl substitutions at 
the second carbon on the ring).368 Gilead argued this was overly broad 
because there were billions of potential structures that could result.369 
The patent itself also disclosed “enormous quantities” of the 2’-methyl-
up nucleosides that could be effective against HCV.370 The Federal 
Circuit agreed and held that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
not know, without undue experimentation, which 2’-methyl-up 
nucleosides would be effective to treat HCV.371 Because the 
 
 363. Id. at 1376, 1378, 1380 (“[T]he record evidence demonstrates that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not have known or understood that uncoated PPI is effective.”). 
 364. Id. at 1376, 1380–81 (“[O]ur case law does not require experimental data 
demonstrating effectiveness . . . . In light of the fact that the specification provides 
nothing more than the mere claim that uncoated PPI might work, even though 
persons of ordinary skill in the art would not have thought it would work, the 
specification is fatally flawed. It does not demonstrate that the inventor possessed more 
than a mere wish or hope that uncoated PPI would work, and thus it does not 
demonstrate that he actually invented what he claimed: an amount of uncoated PPI that 
is effective to raise the gastric pH to at least 3.5.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 365. 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 366. Id. at 1153. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 1154–55. 
 369. Id. at 1155. 
 370. Id. at 1157. 
 371. Id. at 1156. 
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pharmaceutical had to be effective in treating hepatitis C, the claims 
had both a structural requirement (molecular structure) and a 
functional requirement (effective treatment).372 Idenix did not 
provide enough support for either. As for written description, the 
patent “fail[ed] to provide sufficient blaze marks to direct a POSA to 
the specific subset of 2’-methyl-up nucleosides that are effective in 
treating HCV” or show that the inventor possessed them.373 
Judge Newman dissented, opining that though there were a large 
number of unclaimed variants, the claims of the patent itself were very 
narrow, and a reasonable jury would have understood them to be 
directed to the nucleosides specifically described and shown to have 
antiviral activity.374 She concluded that “[t]he majority’s holding that 
validity under [§] 112 is determined based on whether unclaimed 
subject matter is described and enabled, provides a new path of 
uncertainty and unreliability of the patent grant.”375 
F.   Statutory Bars 
There was only one case involving statutory bars. In Barry v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,376 Dr. Mark Barry brought an action in patent 
infringement against Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”), alleging 
Medtronic induced surgeons to infringe two patents directed to a 
method and system for correcting spinal column anomalies.377 Among 
other things, Medtronic argued the patents were invalid under the 
public-use and on-sale bars.378 In post-trial rulings on jury issues, the 
district court rejected these challenges and confirmed the jury’s 
verdict finding the asserted patents valid.379 Medtronic appealed, and 
the Federal Circuit affirmed.380 
1. Ready for patenting 
As set forth by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit, the public 
use and on-sale bars of Section 102(b) apply where the invention or 
 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. at 1164. 
 374. Id. at 1165–66 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 375. Id. at 1166. 
 376. 914 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 377. Id. at 1316–17. 
 378. Id. at 1316. 
 379. Id. at 1320. 
 380. Id. at 1316. 
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method is “ready for patenting.”381 This requires a finding that the 
invention was reduced to practice, which means the method was 
performed and “shown or known to work for its intended purpose.”382 
Medtronic alleged that Dr. Barry performed surgeries using his 
claimed invention in both August and October 2003, and thus, his 
invention was reduced to practice as of those times.383 The court 
disagreed and held that the evidence instead allowed for the 
reasonable finding that Dr. Barry did not know his invention would work 
for its intended purpose until January 2004, when he completed follow-
ups on those surgeries.384 According to the court, Dr. Barry established 
that the final follow-up appointments were “reasonably needed for the 
determination that the invention worked for its intended purpose.”385 
The court also rejected Medtronic’s argument that only a single 
surgery was needed to determine if the invention worked for its 
intended purpose.386 The court explained that an “‘intended purpose’ 
need not be stated in claim limitations that define the claim scope,” 
but can come from the specification as well.387 In this case, Dr. Barry 
was addressing three types of scoliosis, and the record reflected that 
three separate surgeries were required to ensure the invention worked 
for the intended purpose of resolving each type.388 The court concluded 
that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the claimed 
invention was not “ready for patenting.”389 
2. Public use 
The court also held the invention was not “in public use.”390 
Contrasting the case with the famous Supreme Court corset case, Egbert 
v. Lippmann,391 the court pointed to evidence showing that very few 
people in the operating room had a clear view of the surgical field 
where Dr. Barry was using his invention, and those in the operating 
 
 381. Id. at 1320, 1322 (quoting Polara Eng’g Inc. v. Campbell Co., 894 F.3d 1339, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
 382. Id. at 1321–22 (quoting Polara Eng’g Inc., 894 F.3d at 1348). 
 383. Id. at 1323. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1322–23. 
 386. Id. at 1324. 
 387. Id. at 1325. 
 388. Id. at 1328. 
 389. Id. at 1326. 
 390. Id. at 1321. 
 391. 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881). 
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room were under an implied duty of confidentiality covering at least 
the tools and the techniques used.392 The court accordingly noted in 
dictum that, even if the claimed invention was ready for patenting, it 
was “not exposed or accessible to the public” more than one year 
before the relevant priority date.393 
3. Experimental use 
Moreover, even if the claimed invention was ready for patenting, and 
had been available to the public, the court noted in dictum that the 
experimental use exception would apply and save the challenged 
claims.394 When discussing experimental use, the court considered (1) 
whether Dr. Barry lacked confidence the device would work with 
different types of scoliosis; (2) whether the claimed technique is why 
he attracted patients; (3) whether he was the only one to perform the 
claimed method using his device; and (4) whether he surrendered 
control of the invention before the critical date.395 After considering 
these factors, the court held that substantial evidence showed Dr. 
Barry’s surgeries were experimental, and further that he did not 
surrender control of the invention when he performed his surgeries.396 
4. On-sale bar 
With respect to the on-sale bar, Medtronic challenged a jury 
instruction that stated that “there is a difference between 
‘experimental use’ in the context of patent law and the way that the 
word ‘experiment’ is used in the context of medicine.”397 The court 
rejected this contention, holding the jury’s instruction was appropriate 
given the context of the case.398 
 
 392. Barry, 914 F.3d at 1327. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. at 1328 (“An inventor’s use, while public in one sense, will not be 
considered a statutory public use if the use was experimental.”). 
 395. Id. at 1328–29 (citing Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 396. Id. at 1330–31 (quoting Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)) (emphasizing that objective evidence of experimentation and control of 
the invention are “critically important” for a finding of experimentation). 
 397. Id. at 1331–32. 
 398. Id. (finding that “[i]n light of Medtronic’s suggestions regarding the 
impropriety of medical experimentation without informed consent, it was reasonable 
for the court to address potential confusion”). 
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G.   Utility 
Again, only one case involved utility last year. In Grunenthal GmbH v. 
Alkem Laboratories, Ltd., the Federal Circuit addressed the doctrine of 
patent utility.399 The court explained that the “bar for utility is not 
high.”400 A patent must have (1) specific utility—that is, a “well-defined 
and particular benefit to the public”—and it must have (2) substantial 
(or practical) utility—that is, a “significant and presently available 
benefit to the public.”401 For pharmaceutical patents, the court 
explained practical utility may be shown by evidence of “any 
pharmacological activity.”402 
On appeal, defendants argued the patents lacked a specific utility 
because the specification only vaguely states “Crystalline Form A . . . 
has the same pharmacological activity as Form B but is more stable 
under ambient conditions” and “can be advantageously used as [an] 
active ingredient in pharmaceutical compositions.”403 The court 
rejected this argument, explaining that the specification taught  the 
crystalline Form A “is used for the treatment of pain or the treatment of 
urinary incontinence,” and that was sufficient to disclose a practical 
benefit to the public.404 The defendants also argued that the patents 
lacked a substantial utility because they fail to prove Form A’s “superior 
stability over Form B” by test data.405 The court rejected this argument as 
well, explaining that requiring test data for utility is too high a bar—”[a]ll 
that is necessary is evidence that a POSA would accept the claimed utility 






 399. 919 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 400. Id. at 1345. 
 401. Id. (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 402. Id. (citing Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 403. Id. at 1345–46 (alteration in original). 
 404. Id. at 1346 (“The prior art confirms that tapentadol hydrochloride was known 
as an analgesic at the time of filing . . . . Therefore, the [patent] concretely discloses 
the practical benefit of Form A.”). 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. (“While test results often support claims of utility in patents concerning 
pharmacological arts, such testing is not always required.” (citing Rasmusson v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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III.    INFRINGEMENT 
A.   Doctrine of Equivalents 
In Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. IPS Group, Inc.,407 the court also 
addressed appeals from two related district court decisions granting 
summary judgment of noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,854,310 
(“the ‘310 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,595,054 (“the ‘054 
patent”).408 The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of 
noninfringement of the ‘310 patent, holding that the district court 
correctly applied the term “cover panel” and found the accused device 
not literally infringing because its keypad is an extension of the device 
through an opening in the housing, not a part of the device itself as IPS 
contended.409 The court also rejected IPS’s argument under the doctrine 
of equivalents, holding that it would vitiate claim limitations requiring 
keypad buttons to be located on the cover panel included in the housing, 
which the patent repeatedly distinguished from the device itself.410 
The court, however, vacated and remanded the district court’s 
judgment of noninfringement of the ‘054 patent, holding it erred in 
construing the term “receivable within” to require the device to fit 
“entirely” within the claimed housing and incorrectly excluded the 
preferred embodiment.411 The court held that, consistent with the 
plain meaning of the term and the intrinsic record, “receivable within” 
should be construed as “capable of being contained substantially 
inside” the housing base, and remanded for further proceedings on 
the issue of infringement under the proper construction.412 
In UCB, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories Inc.,413 UCB asserted infringement 
by Watson of the patents in suit—U.S. Patent Nos. 6,884,434 (“the ‘434 
patent”) and 8,232,414 (“the ‘414 patent”)—covering UCB’s branded 
drug Neupro, which is a rotigotine transdermal patch without using 
 
 407. 914 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 408. Id. at 1351. 
 409. Id. at 1360–61. 
 410. Id. at 1361–62 (“Allowing IPS to greatly expand the scope of the ‘310 patent claims, 
to cover a parking meter with buttons located nearly anywhere on the outside of the meter, 
would disserve members of the public who seek to avoid infringing those claims.”). 
 411. Id. at 1363–65 (“[A] departure from th[e] general rule [that a patentee is 
normally entitled to the full scope of its claim language] may be warranted only where 
the patentee either clearly sets forth a different definition of a claim term in the 
specification or disavows the full scope of the claim term during prosecution.”). 
 412. Id. at 1365. 
 413. 927 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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water.414 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
that (1) Watson’s proposed generic product infringed the ‘434 patent 
under the doctrine of equivalents;415 (2) the ‘434 patent claims were 
not invalid as anticipated or obvious;416 and (3) the ‘414 patent claims 
were invalid as anticipated because they were “known or used by 
others” in the United States before the date of invention.417 
Application of the doctrine of equivalents in UCB involved whether 
a polyisobutylene adhesive used in Watson’s proposed product is 
interchangeable with the claimed acrylate-based or silicone-based 
polymer adhesives.418 Watson made several arguments relying on (1) 
prosecution history estoppel, (2) narrow claiming, (3) vitiation, and 
(4) ensnarement, to limit the application of the doctrine.419 The court 
rejected each, reasoning that (1) UCB’s election “with traverse” to 
prosecute claims to an silicone- or acrylate-based polymer adhesive 
system in response to the restriction requirement did not surrender 
polyisobutylene as an equivalent;420 (2) there was insufficient indication 
from the specification or claims, or the inventor’s knowledge, to 
conclude that UCB surrendered polyisobutylene as an equivalent;421 (3) 
finding polyisobutylene to be an equivalent does not vitiate the 
silicone-based or acrylate-based limitation;422 and (4) Watson failed to 
prove UCB’s equivalence theory ensnares the prior art.423 
The court also agreed with the district court’s substantive 
application of the doctrine of equivalents finding polyisobutylene was 
interchangeable with silicone in the claimed polymer adhesive 
system.424 In so doing, the court rejected the argument that the district 
 
 414. Id. at 1275. 
 415. Id. at 1286. 
 416. Id. at 1286–89. 
 417. Id. at 1289, 1291. 
 418. Id. at 1278. 
 419. See id. at 1278–84. 
 420. Id. at 1278–80. 
 421. Id. at 1280–82 (contrasting the facts with an earlier case where the court held 
that infringement was not supported under the doctrine of equivalents). 
 422. Id. at 1283 (“As explained below, the district court here conducted a specific 
analysis as to whether polyisobutylene would be covered, and it had adequate reasons 
for why a skilled would understand that [it] would work just as well as acrylate or 
silicone for the claimed transdermal patch.”). 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 1284–85. 
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court had clearly erred by relying on evidence comparing UCB’s 
branded product with the accused generic product.425 
Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSciences Inc.426 involved the issue of 
prosecution history estoppel in the doctrine of equivalents analysis.427 
Amgen sued Coherus alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 
8,273,707 (“the ‘707 patent”) under the doctrine of equivalents based 
on Coherus’s filing of an abbreviated Biologic License Application 
(aBLA) seeking FDA approval for a biosimilar version of Amgen’s 
biologic drug product Neulasta.428 The district court granted 
Coherus’s motion to dismiss, holding that prosecution history estoppel 
barred Amgen from asserting the doctrine of equivalents.429 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed.430 
The Federal Circuit first explained that prosecution history estoppel 
may come up “either (1) by making a narrowing amendment to the 
claim (‘amendment-based estoppel’) or (2) by surrendering claim scope 
through argument to the patent examiner (‘argument-based 
estoppel’).”431 The court agreed with the district court that argument-
based estoppel applied because Amgen distinguished a prior art 
reference by arguing that it did not teach or suggest the “particular 
combinations of salts“ that Amgen claimed.432 The court held that Amgen 
“clearly and unmistakably surrendered unclaimed salt combinations 
during prosecution” and were thus estopped from arguing that Coherus’s 
aBLA, which does not use the claimed combinations of salts, infringed the 
‘707 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.433 
Amgen argued that estoppel does not apply because it distinguished 
the prior art reference for other reasons.434 The court disagreed, 
holding Amgen asserted multiple reasons and “estoppel can attach to 
 
 425. Id. at 1285–86. 
 426. 931 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 427. Id. at 1156. 
 428. Id. at 1156, 1158. 
 429. Id. at 1158. 
 430. Id. at 1156. 
 431. Id. at 1159 (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 432. Id. at 1160. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. (“Amgen asserted three bases for distinguishing [the patent]: (1) ‘[n]o 
combinations of salts [are] taught nor suggested in the . . . patent’; (2) ‘nor [are] the 
particular combinations of salts recited in the pending claims taught nor suggested in 
[the patent]’; and (3) ‘[t]here is no description or suggestion in [the patent] for the 
use of any combination of salts to increase the dynamic capacity of a HIC.’”). 
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each argument.”435 Amgen also argued that its final submission before 
allowance, which did not include the argument that the reference 
failed to disclose the claimed salt combinations, “must be the focus” of 
the analysis.436 The court held this argument not supported by case law 
and disagreed that Amgen could “erase[]” its prior statements by not 
including them in a later submission.437 
In an appeal from the ITC, the Federal Circuit in Ajinomoto Co. v. 
International Trade Commission438 affirmed the Commission, including 
its determination of infringement by certain products of CJ 
CheilJedang Corp. (“CJ”)439 under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Ajinomoto owned a patent claiming E. coli bacteria genetically 
modified with the ability to produce increased volumes of aromatic L-
amino acids such as L-tryptophan.440 Ajinomoto sued CJ alleging that 
it imported products using infringing strains of E. coli bacteria.441 
The Federal Circuit held that the Commission properly rejected CJ’s 
prosecution history estoppel argument based on a claim amendment 
made during prosecution because the “tangential relation” exception 
applied.442 The court agreed with the Commission that the reason for the 
narrowing amendment was “peripheral, or not directly relevant” to the 
equivalent in question.443 The court further rejected CJ’s substantive 
challenge to the Commission’s application of the “function-way-result” 
test, concluding the Commission’s finding of equivalence for each 
prong of the test was supported by substantial evidence.444 
In Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,445 Amgen sued Sandoz for infringement 
under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act446 and 
appealed the district court’s claim construction and summary 
judgment of noninfringement.447 The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
claim construction that Amgen’s method claims reciting the “washing” 
 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 1161. 
 437. Id. 
 438. 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 439. Id. at 1345–46. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 1347. 
 442. Id. at 1353–56. 
 443. Id. at 1354. 
 444. Id. at 1356. 
 445. 923 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 446. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). 
 447. Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1025. 
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and “eluting” steps required the two steps as a separate process 
performed by adding discrete solutions in sequence.448 Since Sandoz’s 
biosimilar products involved a one-step process—applying a solution 
with no separate washing or eluting steps—and thus did not meet this 
limitation, the court affirmed that Sandoz did not literally infringe.449 
Amgen also asserted infringement by equivalents; however, the court 
concluded that the district court correctly held Sandoz’s one-step, one-
solution process did not function in substantially the same way as the 
claimed three-step, three-solution process.450 The court explained that 
extending claim scope to cover the Sandoz process as Amgen urged 
was not warranted because the doctrine of equivalents is not “regularly 
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims.”451 
B.   Literal Infringement 
In CenTrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Technologies, Inc., CenTrak asserted that 
Sonitor infringed as a “final assembler” of the accused system, and 
appealed the district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement.452 
The Federal Circuit first clarified that “a final assembler can be liable for 
making an infringing combination—assuming the evidence supports 
such a finding—even if it does not make each individual component 
element.”453 Finding a triable issue of fact based on CenTrak’s cited 
evidence that Sonitor oversaw the “installation” of the accused system and 
performed the “configuration” and “data entry” for the system to work, the 
court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.454 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc.,455 the Federal Circuit addressed both 
literal infringement and infringement by equivalents.456 The court reversed 
the district court’s finding of literal infringement, reasoning that it erred in 
holding the claimed step of “administration of pemetrexed disodium” was 
 
 448. Id. at 1028–29. 
 449. Id. at 1029. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. (quoting London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991)). 
 452. 915 F.3d 1360, 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“A reasonable jury could find that 
before an accused Sonitor system goes online, Sonitor personnel complete at least a 
portion of the final system configuration . . . in other words, that Sonitor makes a 
combination of hardware and software that is ‘configured’ to infringe.”). 
 453. Id. at 1372. 
 454. Id. at 1372–74. 
 455. 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 456. Id. at 1327. 
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met because the accused pemetrexed ditromethamine product was 
dissolved before administration and contained pemetrexed and chloride 
anions and sodium and tromethamine cations.457 To literally infringe, the 
court concluded, the pemetrexed disodium itself must be administered.458 
The court held the accused product was not literally infringing because it 
did not administer the pemetrexed disodium salt.459 
The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s finding of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.460 The defendants argued 
that Lilly’s claim was precluded by prosecution history estoppel, and the 
disclosure-dedication rule, under which what is disclosed but not claimed is 
“considered dedicated to the public.”461 With respect to prosecution history 
estoppel, the court agreed with Lilly that the “tangential” exception applied 
and held that the claim amendment made during prosecution was “merely 
tangential” to the equivalent in question, pemetrexed ditromethamine, 
holding the prosecution history to support the reason for the amendment 
was not to surrender other functionally identical pemetrexed salts.462 The 
court also agreed with Lilly that the disclosure-dedication rule was 
inapplicable because the asserted patent did not “disclose” methods of 
treatment using pemetrexed ditromethamine.463 The court further rejected 
the defendants’ substantive challenge to the district court’s application of the 
doctrine of equivalents and agreed with Lilly that the chemical differences 
between sodium and tromethamine were not clinically relevant because the 
two chemicals did not possess therapeutic activity.464 
C.   Indirect Infringement 
In Grunenthal GmbH v. Alkem Laboratories Ltd., the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision that the defendants did not induce 
infringement of or contributorily infringe claims of the asserted patent 
 
 457. Id. at 1328–29. 
 458. Id. at 1329. 
 459. Id. (“There is no dispute that Hospira has only sought approval to market pemetrexed 
ditromethamine and that neither its proposed product nor methods of administering it will 
constitute administering the pemetrexed disodium salt.” (citation omitted)). 
 460. Id. at 1336. 
 461. Id. at 1331, 1334. 
 462. Id. at 1331 (“As a general matter, we find Appellants’ view of prosecution 
history estoppel, and the tangential exception in particular, too rigid.”). 
 463. Id. at 1334. 
 464. Id. at 1335 (“As the district court found, [the defendant’s] product will 
accomplish an identical aim, furnishing the same amount of pemetrexed to active sites 
in the body; in exactly the same way.”). 
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covering treatment of polyneuropathic pain.465 The defendants sought 
FDA approval to market a generic version of Nucynta® ER containing 
tapentadol hydrochloride and filed “Section viii” statements under 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) to carve out polyneuropathic pain and 
identify in the proposed labels only severe chronic pain that is not 
covered by the patent.466 With respect to induced infringement, the 
court held the proposed labels did not sufficiently support the specific 
intent of the defendants to encourage users to treat polyneuropathic 
pain with the proposed generic product, noting that even if, as the 
plaintiffs contended, severe chronic pain could be polyneuropathic 
pain, it also included non-polyneuropathic pains.467 The issue in the 
contributory infringement case was whether there were “substantial,” or 
“not unusual,” noninfringing uses indicated for the proposed generic 
product to defeat contributory infringement.468 The court agreed with 
the district court’s conclusion based on credibility determinations of 
experts on both sides that treating non-polyneuropathic pains with 
tapentadol hydrochloride would be not unusual.469 
IV.    EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
A.   Licensing 
In Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung Der Angewandten Forschung E.V. 
v. Sirius XM Radio Inc.,470 the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s 
granting of Sirius XM’s motion to dismiss based on a patent license 
defense.471 Here, Fraunhofer entered into an exclusive license agreement 
with WorldSpace International Network, Inc. (“WorldSpace”) related to 
its multicarrier modulation technology.472 “Multicarrier modulation is a 
method for transmitting a main data stream over multiple carrier data 
streams.”473 WorldSpace entered into a sublicense agreement with 
Sirius XM, which was allowed under the license agreement with 
 
 465. 919 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 466. Id. at 1339–40. 
 467. Id. (noting that the appellants failed to establish that the proposed labels 
“implicitly or explicitly encourage or instruct users to take action that would inevitably 
lead to use of tapentadol hydrochloride for treatment of polyneuropathic pain”). 
 468. Id. at 1340. 
 469. Id. at 1340–41. 
 470. 940 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 471. Id. at 1374. 
 472. Id. at 1375. 
 473. Id. 
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Fraunhofer; WorldSpace, however, filed for bankruptcy ten years later 
and rejected the license agreement with Fraunhofer.474 While rejecting 
a licensing agreement during bankruptcy was deemed to be a breach 
of contract under the holding in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. 
Tempnology, LLC,475 Fraunhofer never terminated the agreement.476 
Fraunhofer—years later—sued Sirius XM for patent infringement.477 
Sirius XM countered by indicating it possessed a license to use 
Fraunhofer’s technology.478 The issues here were (1) whether 
Fraunhofer terminated the agreement with WorldSpace and (2) 
whether the sublicense could survive even if the agreement with 
WorldSpace was terminated.479 The Federal Circuit held that the district 
court failed to consider whether Fraunhofer successfully terminated the 
agreement with WorldSpace.480 The Federal Circuit instructed the 
district court to consider on remand whether Fraunhofer gave notice of 
termination “within a reasonable time.”481 Further, assuming the 
agreement was terminated, the court held the agreement lacked a 
provision indicating whether sublicenses’ rights survived termination of 
the agreement.482 As such, the court remanded this issue for the district 
court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties 
intended for sublicensee’s rights to survive termination.483 
V.    PATENT OFFICE APPEALS 
A.   PTAB Procedures 
A massive part of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence this year was 
addressing procedures at the PTAB. Certainly, no case was bigger than 
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (“Arthrex II”).484 In Arthrex II, Arthrex 
argued that the inter partes review (IPR) that invalidated its patent was 
unconstitutional because the appointment of the PTAB’s administrative 
patent judges (APJs) violated the Appointments Clause of the 
 
 474. Id. at 1375–76. 
 475. 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1666 (2019). 
 476. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, 940 F.3d at 1376. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. at 1377. 
 479. Id. at 1378, 1380. 
 480. Id. at 1380. 
 481. See id. at 1379. 
 482. Id. at 1381. 
 483. Id. at 1382. 
 484. 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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Constitution.485 The Appointments Clause provides that “[The President] . . . 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States.”486 Arthrex claimed that APJs were such officers.487 
The Federal Circuit agreed. According to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo,488 an Officer of the United States is one 
“who ‘exercise[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States.’”489 As neither party nor the government contested that 
APJs were at least Officers of the United States by this definition, the 
court turned to determining whether APJs were inferior or principal 
officers.490 This analysis considered three factors: “(1) whether an 
appointed official has the power to review and reverse the officers’ 
decision; (2) the level of supervision and oversight an appointed 
official has over the officers; and (3) the appointed official’s power to 
remove the officers.”491 The Federal Circuit determined that all these 
factors favored considering APJs to be principal officers and thus 
subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.492 
Having decided that the entirety of the IPR system was 
unconstitutional, the Federal Circuit sought the narrowest remedy 
possible to bring the system back into favorable light with the 
Constitution.493 This remedy, it decided, was to sever the restriction of 
removal by the Director of the USPTO of APJs.494 By statute, APJs could 
only be removed by the Director “only for such cause as will promote 
the efficiency of the service.”495 Making APJs removable without cause, 
the court concluded, rendered APJs as inferior officers that are not 
subject to the Appointments Clause.496 
 
 485. Id. at 1327. 
 486. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 487. Arthrex II, 941 F.3d at 1327. 
 488. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 489. Arthrex II, 941 F.3d at 1327–28 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 125–26). 
 490. Id. at 1328. 
 491. Id. at 1329 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664–65 (1997)). 
 492. Id. at 1329, 1331–32, 1334–35. 
 493. Id. at 1335, 1338. 
 494. Id. at 1338. 
 495. Id. at 1333 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)(2012)); see also id. at 1338 (“Title 35 U.S.C. 
§ 3(c) declares the applicability of Title 5 rights to ‘Officers and employees of the Office.’”). 
 496. Id. at 1336. 
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In AC Technologies S.A. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,497 the court affirmed a decision 
of the PTAB ruling the claims of the challenged patent unpatentable.498 
The PTAB initially instituted review on the first two grounds of the three 
presented in the petition.499 After a final written decision finding some but 
not all claims to be unpatentable, Amazon moved for reconsideration on 
the third ground, which the PTAB granted.500 Following additional briefing 
and submission of evidence, the PTAB found that Amazon showed the 
remaining claims to be unpatentable.501 On appeal, AC argued that the 
Board exceeded its statutory authority and violated due process when it 
invalidated the claims based on a noninstituted ground in the original 
institution decision.502 The court held AC’s argument foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,503 which held the 
PTAB must institute on all claims and grounds presented in the petition or 
not at all.504 The court also held no due process violation occurred because 
AC had notice and an opportunity to be heard and never requested a 
hearing on the third ground.505 
In SIPCO, LLC v. Emerson Electric Co.,506 the Federal Circuit analyzed 
whether a patent was directed to a “technological invention” and therefore 
barred from covered business method (CBM) review under the America 
Invents Act.507 The claims at issue required a “low-power transceiver” 
connected to the internet and wirelessly connected to a remote device.508 
The court first turned to 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b), promulgated by the 
USPTO, which defined the statutory phrase “technological invention” as 
requiring the claimed subject matter as a whole (1) to recite a “novel and 
unobvious” technological feature and (2) to “solve[] a technical problem 
using a technical solution.”509 After reviewing both the claims and the 
specification, the court concluded that the claimed invention satisfied part 
two, holding that it “implements a communication system that connects an 
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unconnected, remote device with a central station” and that the patent 
identified certain problems and offers the solution of creating a 
communication system “through a low-power, i.e., limited transmission 
range, transceiver.”510 But because the Board did not examine part one of 
§ 42.301(b), the court remanded the issue to the Board.511 
The Federal Circuit’s disposition of the technological invention 
exception was predicated upon its disagreement with the Board’s 
construction of “low-power transceiver.”512 The court held the term 
“low-power” to mean that a transceiver operates at a power level 
corresponding to “limited transmission range,” reversing the Board’s 
construction that a transceiver consumes less power.513 The court held the 
specification consistently tied the low-power transceiver to a limited 
transmission distance and rejected the Board’s finding that “low-power” was 
not necessarily coextensive with a limited transmission range.514 
In General Electric Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,515 the Federal Circuit 
dismissed General Electric’s (GE) appeal from the PTAB for lack of 
Article III standing.516 The PTAB found that GE did not show the 
challenged patent claims to be unpatentable for obviousness.517 On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit held that GE failed to show a sufficient 
injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing to appeal.518 The court 
rejected GE’s theories of alleged competitive harms and economic 
injuries, finding them too speculative to support constitutional 
standing and untethered to the asserted patent.519 The court also 
upheld that estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)—which prohibits an 
IPR petitioner from later asserting in a court action any invalidity 
ground that it “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the 
IPR—alone does not create injury-in-fact.520 
In Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,521 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision finding certain claims of 
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U.S. Patent No. 9,189,437 unpatentable for obviousness.522 Not only 
rejecting the appeal on the merits, the court also held issue preclusion 
provides an alternative ground to affirm.523 Weeks before the Board 
decision, the Board rendered final written decisions in two other 
proceedings involving patents that shared a specification with the ‘437 
patent and contained related claim terms.524 The Board found the claims 
of those patents unpatentable, relying on the same prior art references 
cited against the ‘437 patent claims.525 Papst voluntarily dismissed appeals 
of the two decisions shortly before the scheduled oral argument.526 Relying 
on B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,527 the Federal Circuit held 
that issue preclusion applied to the ‘437 patent appeal because the decision 
from the related proceeding became “final” based on voluntary dismissal of 
the appeal and the issues resolved against Papst in that proceeding were 
“essential” to the Board’s decision against the ‘437 patent claims.528 The 
court concluded that Papst’s course of action did not support an exception 
to issue preclusion because, after all, Papst litigated all the way through to 
final written decisions and up to the eve of appellate oral argument.529 
In Regents of University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp.,530 the Federal Circuit 
held that state sovereign immunity does not apply to IPR proceedings.531 
University of Minnesota (UMN) appealed the USPTO’s decisions 
declining to dismiss petitions for IPR brought against UMN’s patents on 
state sovereign immunity grounds.532 Citing Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.533 as controlling authority, the Federal Circuit 
rejected UMN’s argument that state sovereign immunity applies to IPR 
proceedings where the state is the patent owner.534 The court relied on 
the same rationale articulated in Saint Regis to deny trial sovereign 
immunity and concluded that the same factors are “equally applicable 
to state sovereign immunity,” i.e., (1) “the Director, . . . not the private 
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party, [is] who ultimately decides whether to proceed against the 
sovereign;” (2) even if the parties elect not to partake in the proceeding, 
the Board can continue to a final written decision; and (3) IPR is 
procedurally distinct from civil litigation.535 The court also concluded 
that the differences between tribal and state sovereign immunity did 
not support a departure from the reasoning in Saint Regis that IPR is 
an agency’s reconsideration of a patent grant that is “aided by 
information supplied by a third party.”536 
In TQ Delta, LLC v. Dish Network LLC,537 the Federal Circuit addressed 
Patent Owner’s procedural rights under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) in an IPR proceeding.538 While also affirming the PTAB’s 
claim construction and obviousness finding, the court held the PTAB 
did not violate Patent Owner’s APA rights by interpreting a claim term 
in its final written decision.539 Patent Owner argued that it was denied 
notice and an opportunity to be heard under the APA because the 
PTAB sua sponte construed the term that neither party requested.540 
The court rejected Patent Owner’s APA argument, holding that the 
PTAB never construed the term in its institution decision and 
therefore did not “change course” midstream by construing the term 
in the final written decision.541 The court also held that Patent Owner 
was on adequate notice of the claim construction issue and was given 
the opportunity to respond during and after the oral hearing.542 
In Mayne Pharma International Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Corp.,543 the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision finding 
certain claims of the challenged patent as unpatentable for 
anticipation and obviousness.544 The main issue on appeal was whether 
Merck Sharp & Dohme’s (MSD) petition was time-barred under 35 
U.S.C. § 315(b) because it did not list MSD’s parent company—Merck 
& Co., Inc. (MCI)—as a real-party-in-interest until more than a year 
after the service of Mayne Pharma’s complaint naming both MSD and 
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MCI.545 The Board allowed MSD to amend its mandatory notice to 
name MCI without altering the petition’s filing date.546 Mayne Pharma 
argued that the Board should have reset the filing date to the date of 
the amendment.547 MSD countered that the Board decision was not 
appealable and, if it was, should be affirmed because the Board did not 
err in permitting the amendment.548 
The Federal Circuit sided with MSD, concluding that, whether or 
not it was appealable, the Board did not err in permitting the 
amendment to MSD’s real-party-in-interest disclosure without altering 
the petition’s filing date.549 Citing the Board’s finding of “no indication 
of intentional concealment, no bad faith on MSD’s part, no attempt to 
circumvent the estoppel rules, or any other material benefit to it in its 
delay in naming MCI as real party in interest,” the court held the Board 
did not err in finding that MSD’s amendment would serve the “interest 
of justice” under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3).550 The court rejected that 37 
C.F.R. § 42.104(c), which provides for the correction of a mistake in a 
petition, was the sole avenue for amending a petition without changing 
its filing date, citing Board practice and cases to the contrary.551 
In BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, 
Inc.,552 the Federal Circuit, in a motions panel order, dismissed appeals 
from the PTAB’s decisions to not institute IPR under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 314(d).553 BioDelivery filed three petitions for IPR containing a 
combined total of seventeen grounds.554 The Board instituted review 
on one ground from each petition and found all claims subject to the 
instituted grounds not unpatentable in the final written decisions, 
which BioDelivery appealed.555 After oral argument, the Supreme 
Court decided SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, requiring institution to be on 
all or no claims and grounds.556 BioDelivery then moved to remand 
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based on SAS, which the Federal Circuit granted.557 The Board on 
remand decided not to institute on any of the grounds, relying on its 
discretion under § 314(a), and BioDelivery, again, appealed.558 
The motions panel of the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeals, 
stating that § 314(d) “plainly states that the Patent Office’s decision 
whether to institute IPR is not appealable.”559 The panel reasoned that 
“[t]he Board’s vacatur of its institution decisions and termination of 
the proceedings constitute decisions whether to institute inter partes 
review and are therefore ‘final and nonappealable.’”560 The panel 
additionally noted that, even when a petitioner shows a reasonable 
likelihood of success with respect to at least one claim challenged, the 
Board has discretion to not institute.561 Judge Newman dissented, 
arguing that the Board failed to comply with the remand order by not 
addressing all the claims and grounds raised by the petition, consistent 
with SAS.562 
In VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,563 the Federal Circuit addressed estoppel 
under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (pre-AIA), which estopped parties that had 
failed to prove invalidity of a patent in district court from requesting 
inter partes reexamination at the USPTO.564 VirnetX sued Apple in 
district court, asserting infringement of four patents, and Apple filed 
requests for inter partes reexamination of the two patents asserted in 
the district court.565 VirnetX prevailed in the district court, which 
found all asserted claims infringed and not invalid.566 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the finding of no invalidity but vacated and remanded 
the infringement and damages issues related to the two patents in 
reexamination, and Apple did not further appeal to the Supreme 
Court.567 Meanwhile, in the reexamination proceedings, the PTO 
examiner found all claims of the two patents unpatentable.568 VirnetX 
appealed the decision to the Board and also petitioned the PTO to 
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terminate the reexaminations based on the estoppel provision of 
§ 317(b).569 The PTO denied the petition, and the Board subsequently 
affirmed the examiner’s decision of unpatentability.570 VirnetX’s 
appeal to the Federal Circuit followed.571 
The Federal Circuit agreed with VirnetX that Apple’s reexaminations 
were barred by § 317(b), which provides that a “final decision” in a civil 
action triggers estoppel in reexamination proceedings.572 Because the issue 
of invalidity was decided against Apple in the district court and affirmed on 
appeal, the court held the validity decision was “final,” triggering estoppel 
in Apple’s reexamination proceedings.573 The court rejected Apple’s 
arguments—that the validity decision was not final because the 
infringement and damages issues were remanded and because it may file a 
petition for certiorari on those issues—as contrary to the established case 
law and the statutory text and purpose of § 317(b).574 Consequently, the 
court vacated and remanded the case to the Board with instructions to 
terminate the reexaminations.575 Judge Reyna dissented in part, arguing 
that the estoppel provision of § 317(b) should not be triggered 
because Apple may still appeal the issues of infringement and invalidity 
together to the Supreme Court.576 
In Celgene Corp. v. Peter,577 the Federal Circuit addressed whether “the 
retroactive application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is . . . an 
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.”578 In addition to 
affirming the PTAB’s decisions of unpatentability for obviousness, the 
Federal Circuit exercised its discretion to hear Celgene’s constitutional 
argument despite it not having been raised before the Board.579 The 
court recognized the importance of this issue and decided to hear the 
constitutional challenge, pointing that the Supreme Court’s holding 
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in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC580 did not 
directly resolve the issue.581 
The Federal Circuit held that the retroactive application of IPR 
proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking, 
reasoning that there was not a significant difference between IPRs and 
district court and pre-AIA reexamination proceedings.582 While 
acknowledging that IPR proceedings differ from these existing 
proceedings, the Federal Circuit held that the similarities between IPR 
and pre-AIA reexamination proceedings were “far more significant.”583 
In both proceedings, “patents are reviewed on the same substantive 
grounds,” applying the same preponderance of the evidence standard 
of proof and the same broadest reasonable interpretation standard for 
claim construction.584 Additionally, the Federal Circuit highlighted 
that both proceedings sought to serve the same purpose: reviewing an 
earlier agency decision to grant a patent.585 Consequently, the Federal 
Circuit held that the differences between IPRs and the district court 
and pre-AIA reexamination proceedings do not create a constitutional 
issue when IPR is applied to pre-AIA patents.586 
In Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Arthrex I),587 the Federal 
Circuit addressed a patent owner’s procedural rights and opportunity 
to be heard under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).588 The 
issue on appeal stemmed from the Board’s characterization in the final 
written decision of a particular process as “preferred,” rather than 
“well-known,” “accepted,” or “simple” as it was described in the 
petition.589 Arthrex argued that the Board violated its APA rights by 
relying on a new theory of motivation to combine that was not raised 
in the petition without giving adequate notice of the change.590 The 
Federal Circuit held that in finding motivation to combine, the Board 
relied on the same disclosure of a reference, the same combination of 
the asserted references, and the same theory of obviousness presented 
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by the petition and disputed by the parties.591 Under the 
circumstances, the court held that the Board had not violated the APA 
because the Board’s “minor variation” in wording did not deprive 
Arthrex of an opportunity to be heard.592 Ultimately, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision finding the challenged patent 
claims unpatentable for obviousness.593 
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. IBG LLC (Trading 
Technologies I),594 the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decisions 
holding that the patents were eligible for Covered Business Method 
(CBM) review and the claims were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.595 The patents at issue in Trading Technologies I disclosed a 
graphical user interface (“GUI”) for electronic trading.596 The court 
agreed with the PTAB that these patents were eligible for CBM review 
because their claims were directed to a financial trading method used 
by a computer and not for a “technological invention” defined in 37 
C.F.R. § 42.301(b).597 The court stated that the claimed inventions 
were focused on improving the trader, not the computer, and 
therefore did not provide a “technical solution to a technical 
problem.”598 The court also held the claims patent ineligible under 
§ 101, holding that the claims were directed to a patent ineligible 
concept and the claim elements did not transform the nature of the 
claims into a patent-eligible application.599 
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. IBG LLC (Trading 
Technologies II),600 the Federal Circuit addressed a patent directed to 
displaying financial market information on a screen.601 The court 
agreed with the PTAB that the challenged patent in Trading 
Technologies II, like the patents in Trading Technologies I, was eligible for 
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CBM review because it sought to solve the problem that traders needed 
additional information on a trading screen to effectively analyze the 
market and therefore was not for a “technological invention.”602 The 
court also held the claims patent ineligible under § 101 for similar 
reasons as Trading Technologies I: the purported advance over the prior 
art was an abstract idea of “providing a trader with additional financial 
information to facilitate market trades,” and the claim elements, either 
individually or as an ordered combination, did not transform the 
claims into a patent-eligible application.603 
In AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc.,604 AVX appealed a decision from 
the PTAB upholding the patentability of certain claims of the challenged 
patent.605 The Federal Circuit, however, dismissed the appeal without 
reaching its merits because AVX did not have Article III standing to 
appeal.606 Although AVX had a statutory right to petition for an IPR at the 
PTAB because Article III requirements do not apply to administrative 
agencies, it would lack Article III standing to appeal without showing an 
injury-in-fact, either through the existing record or through 
supplementing the record on appeal with affidavits or other evidence.607 
The court rejected AVX’s arguments in support of its standing to appeal. 
First, AVX argued that it was injured by the Board’s decision because 
the statutory estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) would prevent it 
from asserting the same challenges against the upheld claims if Presidio 
were to assert those claims against AVX in the future.608 The court rejected 
this argument for two reasons: (1) the court in previous cases already 
rejected invocation of the estoppel provision as a sufficient basis for injury 
in fact,609 and (2) the court had not yet decided whether estoppel under 
§ 315(e) would be triggered even when the petitioner lacked Article III 
standing to appeal.610 The court declined to decide the preclusive effect of 
§ 315(e) because the parties did not brief the issue.611 
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Second, AVX asserted that the PTAB’s decision reduced AVX’s ability 
to compete with Patent Owner Presidio Components.612 The court 
rejected this argument relying on “competitor standing,” which often 
arises in cases involving government or regulatory actions that impact a 
business’s ability to compete through, for example, lowering prices or 
limiting sales.613 The court recounted several such cases where “the 
challenged government action nonspeculatively threatened economic 
injury to the challenger by the ordinary operation of economic 
forces.”614 The court held that the only government action here was 
upholding certain patent claims, which could have been harmful if AVX 
was “currently using the claimed features or nonspeculatively planning 
to do so in competition”;615 however, AVX failed to show that it was 
engaging, or “nonspeculatively” planning to engage in, conduct 
arguably covered by the upheld patent claims.616 
In Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Co.,617 several IPR petitioners 
appealed a PTAB decision upholding the patentability of the claims of 
the challenged patent directed to a method of treatment involving 
administration of folic acid and a methylmalonic acid lowering agent 
(e.g., vitamin B12) before administering a particular chemotherapy 
agent.618 On appeal, the petitioners argued that the claims were not 
directed to patentable subject matter, an issue arising under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.619 The Federal Circuit declined to reach this issue because 
“Congress expressly limited the scope of inter partes review to a subset 
of grounds that can be raised under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103”; 
therefore, § 101 issues cannot be addressed on appeal of an IPR.620 
In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Industries, 
LLC,621 the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision in an IPR 
finding the challenged patent claims unpatentable and held the IPR 
time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).622 Prior to the IPR, Patent 
Owner sued Fairchild for infringement of several patents, including the 
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challenged patent in the IPR.623 Petitioner entered into a merger 
agreement with Fairchild and, while the merger was pending, filed this 
IPR more than one year after Fairchild was served with the complaint 
alleging infringement of the challenged patent.624 The issue on appeal 
was “whether privity and RPI [real-party-in-interest] relationships arising 
after filing but before institution should be considered for purposes of 
the § 315(b) time-bar.”625 The Federal Circuit held the IPR time-barred 
“because Fairchild was an RPI at the time the IPR was instituted, even 
though it was not an RPI at the time the petition was filed.”626 
Accordingly, the court remanded for the Board to dismiss the IPR.627 
In In re IPR Licensing, Inc.,628 the Federal Circuit reversed an IPR 
decision because the Board erred by relying on a prior art reference that 
was not cited by the petitioner to support its invalidity argument.629 The 
petition asserted three grounds of invalidity, but the Board had only 
instituted one and the reference at issue was cited only in support of a 
noninstituted ground.630 The court explained that the Board’s decision 
could not “rely on evidence relating solely to grounds on which it never 
instituted,” which “a patent owner has no ability to rebut or anticipate.”631 
By withdrawing from the appeal, the petitioner had waived its right to 
request institution of the noninstituted grounds under SAS.632 
In Amerigen Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. UCB Pharma GMBH,633 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding in an IPR that the challenged 
patent’s claims were not unpatentable as obvious.634 The claims related 
to chemical compounds used to formulate an antimuscarinic drug 
used to treat urinary incontinence.635 The court held that Amerigen 
had appellate standing because the asserted patent blocked 
Amerigen’s launch of its tentatively approved abbreviated new drug 
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application, and invalidation of the patent would advance the drug’s 
launch, which constituted a “concrete, economic interest.”636 
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Research Corp. Technologies,637 Research 
Corporation Technologies (“RCT”) sued Mylan, Breckenridge, and 
Alembic (collectively, “Appellants”) for patent infringement in 2013.638 
In 2015, another entity, Argentum, petitioned for IPR of RCT’s patent, 
and the Board instituted Argentum’s petition on two grounds.639 Three 
days after institution, Appellants each filed their own petitions for IPR 
with concurrent motions for joinder.640 The Board instituted Appellants’ 
petitions and joined each proceeding with the Argentum proceeding, 
relying upon the provision of § 315(c), which states that the one-year 
time bar for IPRs does not apply to requests for joinder.641 The Board 
then concluded that none of the challenged claims had been shown to 
be unpatentable.642 Appellants appealed, but Argentum did not.643 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, RCT did not challenge the Board’s 
joinder decision, but did challenge whether Appellants had standing 
to appeal.644 The Federal Circuit looked to the plain text of 35 USC 
§ 315(c), which provides that the Board may join as a party any person 
who properly files a petition.645 Next, the court looked to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 319, which provides that “[a]ny party to the inter partes review shall 
have the right to be a party to the appeal.”646 The court held that once 
the Board joined Appellants as parties, they had a statutory right to 
appeal under § 319.647 
B.   Anticipation 
As expected, many of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit from 
the PTAB centered on anticipation and obviousness issues. Indeed, the 
court in Artic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Products, Inc.648 held that the Board 
 
 636. Id. at 1083–85. 
 637. 914 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 638. Id. at 1371. 
 639. Id. at 1370–71. 
 640. Id. at 1371. 
 641. See id. at 1371–72. 
 642. Id. 
 643. Id. at 1372. 
 644. Id. 
 645. Id. at 1373. 
 646. Id. 
 647. Id. 
 648. 919 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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erred by applying “too rigid a standard” in a diligence analysis.649 Here, 
even though a prior art patent was filed seven months before the 
priority date of the patent at issue, the inventor conceived of the 
invention and diligently reduced it to practice prior to the filing date 
of the prior art patent.650 The court explained that “diligence need not 
be perfectly continuous—only reasonably continuous.”651 The court 
noted that most of the “identified gaps in [the inventor’s] personal 
activity” could be attributed to third-party testing of the invention and 
further held third-party testing “does not give rise to an inference of 
unreasonable delay or abandonment.”652 As a result, the earlier filed 
patent was not prior art.653 Therefore, with respect to one of the patents 
in issue, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.654 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Infobridge 
PTE, Ltd.655 vacated and remanded the Board’s decision for incorrectly 
dating a prior art reference. Here, the Board determined, “Samsung 
failed to show that a certain prior art reference was publicly accessible 
before the . . . critical date [of the patent at issue] and thus could not 
be considered prior art.”656 Judge O’Malley first discussed Samsung’s 
standing to appeal the Board’s decision.657 Samsung argued that it was 
being deprived of royalties which could be traced to the validity of 
Infobridge’s patent, and the court agreed, stating “[w]hile other 
licensing and royalty structures might compel a different result where 
other standard-essential patents are involved, the unique pool license 
here satisfies us that Samsung has standing in this appeal.”658 
Second, the court held the Board erred in evaluating whether a prior 
art reference, named Working Draft 4 (“WD4 reference”), had been 
publicly accessible.659 The WD4 reference was discussed at meetings, 
available on websites, and distributed through listservs to a group of 
 
 649. Id. at 1331. 
 650. Id. at 1325, 1331–32. 
 651. Id. at 1331. 
 652. Id. at 1332 (citing Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 
F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 653. Id. at 1332. 
 654. Id. at 1333. 
 655. 929 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 656. Id. at 1365. 
 657. Id. at 1367. 
 658. Id. at 1368. 
 659. Id. at 1365, 1375. 
2020]     2019 PATENT LAW DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1227 
 
about 250 participants of a July 2011 meeting in Torino, Italy.660 
However, in analyzing whether the WD4 reference was publicly 
available, given the factual circumstances surrounding the distribution 
of reference, “the Board should have considered whether Samsung’s 
evidence established that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have 
accessed the WD4 reference, after exercising reasonable diligence, 
based on the listserv email.”661 The court further concluded that the 
Board had inappropriately focused on whether persons of ordinary 
skill actually received the listserv email.662 
And, in ATI Technologies ULC v. Iancu,663 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the Board’s decision that patents directed to computer 3D-imaging 
software were unpatentable over prior art for the applicant’s failure to 
show diligent reduction to practice.664 The court held that the Board 
erred by requiring a showing of “continuous reasonable diligence” 
instead of the correct “reasonably continuous diligence” standard.665 
ATI had presented almost 1300 pages of documentary evidence of 
activity on “every business day” before ATI’s effective filing date, 
including document logs and folder histories showing the work done, 
when and by whom it was done, and the stages of the product over 
time.666 The Board had reasoned that the evidence was “not self-
explanatory and [did] not explain meaningfully as to which tasks 
[were] reasonably necessary” for reduction to practice of claimed 
elements and optional features, and that ATI failed to identify 
unexplained lapses.667 The Federal Circuit criticized this overly strict 
standard and explained that ATI had more than met its burden with 
its evidence, and the Board had no basis for finding ATI’s technology 
had not been diligently pursued.668 
 
 660. Id. at 1366. 
 661. Id. at 1374–75. 
 662. Id. 
 663. 920 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 664. Id. at 1364–65. Under 37 CFR § 1.131, prior art references may be “sw[orn] 
behind” if the applicant shows either prior reduction to practice or prior conception 
coupled with due diligence. See id. at 1369 (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 715 (9th ed. 2018)). This case concerns the latter. Proving 
conception and due diligence requires documentary support in the form of affidavits 
or declarations supported by original exhibits of drawings or records. Id.; see also 37 
C.F.R. § 1.131(b). 
 665. ATI Techs. ULC, 920 F.3d at 1370. 
 666. Id. 
 667. Id. at 1372. 
 668. Id. at 1373. 
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In Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. TCL Corp.,669 the Federal Circuit 
addressed whether a foreign publication was available as a prior art reference 
against the patent at issue.670 The patent involved an “improvement over 
conventional modes of receiving and processing wireless signals from 
communication systems that operate at differing frequencies.”671 
At the PTAB, petitioner, TCL, attempted to rely on an article 
published in the May/June 1996 edition of a German journal.672 Patent 
owner, Ericsson, argued that the publication was not publicly available 
more than one year before the filing date of July 1, 1997.673 TCL 
attempted to establish public availability by submitting the statement 
of a German librarian stating that the reference was available before 
the critical date, but it was excluded as hearsay when the librarian 
refused to give a sworn statement or testify.674 
TCL then submitted the sworn statement of a second German 
librarian, and Ericsson objected, stating that the submission was 
inadmissible because it was untimely, and thus not in compliance with 
the Board’s rules.675 The Board ultimately held that the declaration 
met regulatory standards, accepted the submission of the statement, 
and found the claims to be unpatentable.676 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first held that the Board did not abuse 
its discretion by allowing the second librarians sworn statement in as 
evidence because the evidence was “reasonably viewed as material, and 
the opponent [had an] adequate opportunity to respond.”677 The court 
then went on to hold that the reference at issue was publicly available prior 
to the critical date of the patent and that there was substantial evidence 
supporting the Board’s decision.678 The Federal Circuit also affirmed the 
Board’s decision that the patent claims were obvious.679 
In Honeywell International Inc. v. Arkema Inc.,680 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the PTAB abused its discretion when it rejected 
 
 669. 941 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 670. Id. at 1342. 
 671. Id. at 1342–43. 
 672. Id. at 1344. 
 673. Id. 
 674. Id. at 1344–45. 
 675. Id. at 1345. 
 676. Id. at 1342, 1345. 
 677. Id. at 1345. 
 678. Id. at 1347. 
 679. Id. at 1351. 
 680. 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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Honeywell’s request to file a motion for leave to seek a certificate of 
correction from the PTO Director.681 Honeywell’s patent, issued in 
2015, recited a chain of priority applications dating back to 2002; 
however, when Honeywell canceled all twenty claims and added new 
matter to its application, it failed to make those amendments in the 
priority applications.682 As a result, the patent’s priority date was 
challenged during post-grant review due to a lack of written 
description in the priority applications.683 Because the PTAB has 
exclusive jurisdiction over post-issuance review proceedings, Honeywell 
requested permission for a motion to leave in order to then request a 
certificate of correction from the PTO Director to amend the priority 
chain.684 Under 35 U.S.C. § 255, the Director alone has the discretion to 
determine when a certificate of correction is appropriate.685 The Board 
cannot review the merits of the patentee’s position on whether a mistake 
is correctable but must only determine whether there is a sufficient basis 
to support that position.686 The Board decided that Honeywell had failed 
to show that the requirements of § 255 were met. By deciding 
Honeywell’s petition on the merits, the Board incorrectly assumed the 
authority delegated to the Director by § 255.687 
C.   Obviousness 
Many of the court’s obviousness opinions were for appeals 
originating in the PTAB. One such case was Realtime Data, LLC v. 
Iancu.688 In this appeal from an IPR, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
PTAB’s final written decision finding all challenged claims 
unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art.689 On appeal, 
Realtime Data, LLC (“Realtime”) challenged whether the PTAB erred 
in its determination that an ordinary artisan would have been 
 
 681. Id. at 1346. 
 682. Id. 
 683. Id. 
 684. Id. at 1347–48 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.323 (2019)). 
 685. A certificate of correction is appropriate when there is a “mistake of a clerical 
or typographical nature, or of minor character, which was not the fault of the Patent 
and Trademark Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 255 (2012); see also Honeywell, 939 F.3d at 1348 
(holding the PTAB abused its discretion by assuming the power held by the Director 
to issue certificates of correction under 35 U.S.C. § 255). 
 686. Honeywell, 939 F.3d at 1349. 
 687. Id. at 1347, 1350. 
 688. 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 689. Id. at 1369–70. 
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motivated to combine teachings from two prior art references.690 The 
court rejected Realtime’s contention, holding that the specific 
obviousness ground raised by the petitioner did not require the PTAB 
to make any findings as to the motivation to combine.691 In particular, 
although the ground identified two references, it in actuality was a 
single reference obviousness challenge that merely cited a second 
reference to inform how an ordinary artisan would understand the 
first—not for any element or teaching it might include.692 
In Personal Web Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,693 Apple Inc. 
petitioned for IPR of a patent owned by Personal Web Technologies, 
LLC (“Personal Web”), alleging its claims would have been obvious in 
view of two prior art references.694 The claims covered a method and 
an apparatus for avoiding problems that arise during traditional 
naming of protocols in a conventional data processing system, such as 
duplication of a data item.695 The PTAB determined the claims would 
have been obvious in part by finding that one of the prior art 
references inherently taught a claim limitation.696 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding this inherency finding lacked 
substantial evidentiary support.697 The court explained that, although 
it was possible that the prior art used the claim limitation, the patentee 
identified an equally plausible, “if not more plausible,” understanding 
of the prior art that would not use the claim element.698 Because 
inherency cannot be shown by probabilities or possibilities but must 
necessarily exist, the court held that the patentee’s equally-plausible 
alternative precluded a holding that the prior art reference inherently 
disclosed the claim element.699 The PTAB’s reliance on inherency to 
establish obviousness was, therefore, deemed improper.700 
 
 690. Id. at 1372. 
 691. Id. at 1373. The Court noted that the petitioner raised its ground in the 
alternative, either (1) as a single reference obviousness ground that relied on a second 
reference to explain how a skilled artisan would understand the first, or (2) as a two-
reference obviousness ground. Id. at 1372–73. The PTAB adopted the former theory 
in its final written decision. Id. at 1372. 
 692. Id. at 1373. 
 693. 917 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 694. Id. at 1377. 
 695. Id. at 1377–78. 
 696. Id. at 1378, 1381. 
 697. Id. at 1377. 
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In Game & Technology Co. v. Activision Blizzard Inc.,701 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a PTAB final written decision determining that 
challenged claims would have been obvious.702 The patent disclosed a 
method and system for providing game items to Internet game 
characters and generating a type of avatar, which the patent referred 
to as a “gamvatar,” that is equipped with particular game items.703 The 
PTAB determined the claims would have been obvious in view of a 
manual alone, or in view of the manual and a published U.S. patent 
application.704 On appeal, the patentee challenged the PTAB’s 
conclusion that the manual disclosed or rendered obvious the claimed 
“gamvatar.”705 In particular, it argued that the manual did not describe 
using a “gamvatar” in a location distinct from a specific game or using 
one that had layers for performing certain game item functions.706 It 
also argued one reference could not provide the basis for an 
obviousness challenge.707 The Federal Circuit rejected these 
contentions, stating that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s 
finding regarding the manual’s teachings and that a single reference 
may provide the basis for an obviousness challenge.708 
In Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc. v. Graco Children’s Products, Inc.,709 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination that the patentee 
failed to antedate the prior art and thereby affirmed the PTAB’s 
decision holding the claims unpatentable.710 Graco Children’s 
Products, Inc. (“Graco”) filed two petitions for IPR that challenged two 
design patents owned by Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc. (“Kolcraft”).711 
Kolcraft did not submit a patent owner preliminary response, but after 
the PTAB instituted both petitions, Kolcraft submitted a brief patent 
owner response that included an inventor declaration, with exhibits 
purporting to show conception and reduction to practice before the 
prior art.712 The exhibits appended to the declaration did not, on their 
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face, identify a specific conception date or author, and the declaration 
redacted relevant date information “using blank spaces where relevant 
dates would have been.”713 During deposition, the inventors explained 
that relevant date information was in the metadata of computer files 
containing the exhibits.714 Before the hearing, Kolcraft filed an 
unredacted version of the declaration.715 Kolcraft never submitted the 
computer files with the metadata.716 
The PTAB declined to review the unredacted declaration, 
considering it waived because it was raised for the first time at the oral 
hearing.717 In view of the other remaining evidence of record, the 
PTAB concluded Kolcraft failed to show conception and reduction to 
practice before the prior art.718 In particular, it reasoned the inventors’ 
testimony was not sufficiently corroborated by noninventor testimony, 
documents, or other evidence.719 Kolcraft failed to antedate the prior 
art and the PTAB held the challenged claims were unpatentable.720 
On appeal, Kolcraft only challenged the PTAB’s decision on 
conception and reduction to practice.721 The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
PTAB’s decision, holding that it was supported by record evidence.722 The 
court held Kolcraft failed to corroborate its inventors’ testimony because 
it did not submit testimony, documents, or evidence that did not derive 
from the inventors.723 It noted that although the court was “capable of 
comparing the photos and sketches,” the exhibits were undated and lacked 
a showing of authorship; thus, they could not offer corroboration.724 
Likewise, the metadata could not corroborate the exhibits as it was not 
entered into the record.725 As Kolcraft did not antedate the prior art 
reference, the PTAB’s conclusion of obviousness was proper.726 
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In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLC,727 the Federal Circuit vacated 
and remanded the PTAB’s decision confirming the patentability of 
certain claims, holding that the PTAB relied on an incorrect 
construction of the term “synchronization signal.”728 According to the 
court, the PTAB improperly imported limitations from the 
specification and limited the term to “the ‘advantageous’ clock-based 
preferred embodiment.”729 In the court’s view, the specification 
broadly prescribed a number of “[o]ther forms of timing signals.”730 It 
therefore reasoned that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the 
term is “not limited to describing what the signal must synchronize or 
to a particular type of synchronization.”731 In light of this 
understanding, the court construed “synchronization signal” to mean 
“‘used to establish or maintain a timing relationship between 
transceivers between the transmitter of the signal and the receiver of 
the signal,’ meaning synchronization signal includes frame 
synchronization.”732 It then remanded the case for the PTAB to assess 
the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the new construction 
in the first instance.733 
In Sony Corp. v. Iancu,734 the Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s claim 
construction and remanded for the PTAB to consider patentability in 
view of a new claim construction.735 The relevant term to be construed 
was “reproducing means,” and there was no dispute this term was a 
means-plus-function limitation.736 The parties agreed the relevant 
function was “reproducing the audio data of the channel designated 
by the default value stored in the storing means.”737 The parties 
disputed, however, what structure corresponded to that function.738 
Sony argued that the corresponding structure was a computer and the 
 
 727. 928 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 728. Id. at 1361–63. 
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associated algorithm needed to carry out the claimed function.739 The 
PTAB disagreed and concluded that the limitation was instead 
implemented in hardware, a controller and a synthesizer, or 
equivalent, and therefore did not require any algorithm.740 
The court agreed with Sony.741 According to the court, the patent 
related to a computer-implementation of the reproducing means and 
was therefore limited to the algorithm provided in the specification.742 
If the reproducing means were implemented in hardware, as the PTAB 
determined, the court stated it would expect the specification to 
describe the circuitry in the controller required to perform the 
claimed function—such an indication was absent.743 As the PTAB had 
not assessed whether the asserted prior art disclosed the claimed 
algorithm, the court remanded for the PTAB to make that assessment 
in the first instance.744 
In Samsung Electronics Co. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC,745 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s final written decisions confirming the 
patentability of the challenged claims.746 At issue were thirteen IPR 
proceedings challenging 105 claims across eleven patents related to 
semiconductor fabrication.747 Each ground of unpatentability relied 
upon the combination of a primary reference, Bertin or Yu, with 
Leedy.748 Each of these references described different dielectric 
materials and fabrication techniques, and Leedy was relied upon for 
its disclosure of “flexible membranes formed of very thin low stress 
dielectric materials” deposited via plasma-enhanced chemical vapor 
deposition.749 The PTAB found that a skilled artisan would not have 
had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings.750 
 
 739. Id. at 1240. 
 740. Id. 
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. 
 743. Id. 
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Crediting the patentee’s expert testimony explaining the complexity 
and nuances involved in fabricating integrated circuits, the PTAB 
found petitioners’ contentions that Leedy suggested a benefit for using 
its material and technique, and that the references were in the same 
field, insufficient to satisfy their burden.751 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding substantial evidence 
supported the PTAB’s finding of no reasonable expectation of 
success.752 It found persuasive, in view of the “complexity of 
semiconductor fabrication,” that a skilled artisan would not reasonably 
expect to successfully change the primary reference’s fabrication to 
use Leedy’s dielectric material and fabrication technique.753 It noted 
eighteen factors are considered when selecting a dielectric and 
method of formation and “most of these factors are unknown here with 
respect to Leedy’s dielectric” and formation.754 It also noted the 
fabrication technique in Leedy was “quite different” than those 
disclosed in the primary references and would introduce impurities 
incompatible with the designs in the primary references.755 The court 
agreed with the PTAB that this would all in turn prevent a skilled 
artisan from “conclud[ing] that it would have been obvious to make 
the proposed substitution.”756 
In Celgene Corp. v. Peter, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
obviousness determination for patent claims directed to methods for 
delivering a drug such that adverse effects were prevented.757 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed that the Board’s finding of no long-felt need 
was not irreconcilable with finding a motivation to combine the prior 
art references to reach the claims at issue.758 The Federal Circuit 
agreed that, especially when safety is involved, there is “no conflict 
between finding a motivation to improve the safety of existing systems 
even though the existing systems were mostly successful.”759 
Neptune Generics, LLC and Mylan Laboratories Ltd. appealed a 
series of IPR decisions concerning Eli Lilly’s patents directed to a 
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method of treatment involving administration of folic acid and vitamin 
B12 with a particular chemotherapy agent in Neptune Generics, LLC v. 
Eli Lilly & Co.760 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that 
the patents were not obvious, and held that substantial evidence 
supported the Board’s conclusions.761 In particular, the FDA did not 
support Eli Lilly’s addition of folic acid and vitamin B12 to the 
treatment during clinical trials but allowed the trials to continue 
regardless of its concerns.762 The Board and Federal Circuit 
determined that agency concern or lack of support did constitute 
actual skepticism, as skepticism need not only be premised on whether 
claimed subject matter is “technically infeasible,” “unworkable,” or 
“impossible” and would work for its intended purpose.763 The Federal 
Circuit explained that precedent “recognizes a range of third-party 
opinion that can constitute skepticism,” including sentiments of worry 
or surprise.764 The court also noted that while evidence that third 
parties found the invention impossible might be due more weight, the 
Board did not err in giving weight to the skepticism evidence here.765 
In Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC,766 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
an IPR decision holding the challenged claims not unpatentable as 
obvious.767 As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit held that the Board 
did not abuse its discretion in disregarding an argument for 
obviousness that was first raised in the petitioner’s reply.768 
As for the Board’s obviousness decision, Henny Penny argued that 
the Board, in analyzing the motivation to combine references, placed 
too much weight on the disadvantages of combining references.769 The 
Federal Circuit rejected the argument, concluding that the Board’s 
factual analysis was “consistent with the longstanding principle that the 
prior art must be considered for all its teachings, not selectively” and 
moreover was supported by substantial evidence.770 The court also 
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affirmed the Board’s decision regarding industry praise.771 The Board 
held that the claim was “commensurate in scope” and that “the 
evidence of praise was generally directed to the claimed invention as a 
whole.”772 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board, noting that 
“industry praise is probative of nonobviousness even if it was not 
precisely limited to the point of novelty of the claimed combination.”773 
The Federal Circuit addressed the “analogous art” doctrine in Airbus 
S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp.774 This case started as an inter partes 
reexamination where the patent owner appealed an examiner’s 
rejection based on obviousness.775 In an appeal to the Board, the patent 
owner, Firepass, argued that the references used against it were not 
analogous art.776 The Board agreed with Firepass and reversed the 
examiner’s rejection, and Airbus appealed.777 
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit explained the standard of 
analogous art, stating, 
[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: “(1) whether 
the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem 
addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s 
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the 
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.”778 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s finding under the first 
prong of the test, but it disagreed with the analysis under the second, 
reasonably pertinent, prong.779 The court held that when making a 
determination of whether a prior art reference is reasonably pertinent, 
making it analogous art, “a reasonable factfinder should consider record 
evidence cited by the parties to demonstrate the knowledge and perspective 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”780 
By not considering Airbus’s cited references, the Federal Circuit 
held that the Board essentially refused to consider record evidence 
offered by the patent challenger.781 The court also held that this refusal 
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was erroneous, and thus, it vacated the Board’s decisions and 
remanded the case.782 
In OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc.,783 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the PTAB’s finding that claims forty-four through forty-six 
and fifty-three of OSI’s cancer treatment patents were unpatentable as 
obvious. OSI’s patent covered a method of using erlotinib to treat non-
small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).784 Prior art broadly disclosed several 
compounds with anti-cancer activity and the use of erlotinib as an 
epidermal growth factor receptor inhibitor to potentially treat some 
cancers, not including NSCLC.785 The Board found that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine these 
references with a reasonable expectation of success.786 The court 
disagreed and held that the Board’s decision that the references 
provide a reasonable expectation of success was not supported by 
substantial evidence.787 The prior art did not disclose any preclinical or 
clinical data about erlotinib’s efficacy in treating NSCLC.788 Though 
efficacy data is not normally required to show a reasonable expectation 
of success, it was necessary here because NSCLC treatment was highly 
unpredictable at the time, with over 99.5% rate of failure for drugs 
entering Phase II clinical studies.789 
In Liqwd, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,790 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the PTAB’s post-grant decision that Liqwd’s claims directed 
to keratin treatment formulations and methods were obvious because 
the Board erred in its weighing of evidence.791 During the PGR, the 
PTAB found that claims one through eight and ten were invalid as 
obvious over prior art references.792 When considering arguments and 
evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness such as copying and 
unfelt need, the Board found that L’Oreal would not have developed 
its products without having access to Liqwd’s confidential 
 
 782. Id. at 1384. 
 783. 939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 784. Id. at 1378–79. 
 785. Id. at 1384–85. 
 786. Id. at 1381. 
 787. Id. at 1383. 
 788. Id. 
 789. Id. at 1385. 
 790. 941 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 791. Id. at 1134–35. 
 792. Id. at 1135. 
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information.793 But the Board disregarded this finding as legally 
irrelevant because Liqwd had not shown that L’Oreal copied a specific 
product.794 Distinguishing its earlier case Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA 
Sports, Inc.,795 where it stated that “copying requires the replication of a 
specific product,” the court held that the Board erred.796 Unlike cases 
where the only circumstantial evidence of copying is a competitor’s product 
arguably falling within the scope of the patent, evidence of actual copying—
a competitor having access to publications, patents, or other proprietary 
information and then using for their own product—is always relevant.797 
Liqwd provided evidence of L’Oreal’s copying efforts which should have 
been considered in the Board’s obviousness analysis.798 
D.   Inventorship 
Interestingly, the court had an opportunity to issue a ruling regarding 
inventorship. In Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. IPS Group, Inc.,799 
Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. (“DPT”) appealed an IPR decision 
that certain of IPS Group’s (“IPS”) patents were not shown to be 
unpatentable as anticipated under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).800 
The two patents at issue in the IPR were unrelated, but both directed 
to similar parking meter technology.801 While U.S. Patent No. 
8,595,054 (“the ‘054 patent”) issued from an application filed more 
than one year prior to the filing of the application that issued as U.S. 
Patent No. 7,854,310 (“the ‘310 patent”), both patents named IPS’s 
founder and CEO, Dave King, as an inventor.802 The ‘054 patent 
additionally listed IPS’s Chief Technical Officer Alexander Schwartz as 
an inventor, while the ‘310 patent listed several engineers from an 
outside design firm.803 IPS did not dispute anticipation on the merits 
but instead argued that the anticipating portions of the ‘054 patent 
were solely the invention of King, and not that of “another” as required 
 
 793. Id. at 1136. 
 794. Id. 
 795. 392 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 796. Id. at 1325; see Liqwd, Inc., 941 F.3d at 1137. 
 797. Liqwd, Inc., 941 F.3d at 1137–38. 
 798. Id. at 1138–39. 
 799. 914 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 800. Id. at 1351. 
 801. Id. at 1352–54. 
 802. Id. at 1352–53. 
 803. Id. 
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by § 102(e).804 DPT argued that Schwartz conceived at least a portion 
of the anticipating disclosure.805 The Board had agreed with IPS, being 
“skeptical that the general recitation . . . of connections and operative 
associations of components constitutes more than what Mr. King 
broadly envisioned.”806 “The Board ultimately held that King was the 
sole inventor of the anticipating disclosure of the ‘054 patent” and thus 
several claims of the ‘310 patent “were held not unpatentable as 
anticipated by the ‘054 patent.”807 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Board had committed 
clear error in finding that Schwartz was not a joint inventor of the 
anticipating portions of the ‘054 patent, rendering it a disclosure “by 
another” for purposes of § 102(e).808 The Federal Circuit articulated 
that whether a reference patent is “by another” for § 102(e) purposes 
required the Board to 
(1) determine what portions of the reference patent were relied on 
as prior art . . . , (2) evaluate the degree to which those portions were 
conceived “by another,” and (3) decide whether that other person’s 
contribution is significant enough, when measured against the full 
anticipating disclosure, to render him a joint inventor of the applied 
portions of the reference patent.809 
Applying this standard, the court held that Schwartz was a joint 
inventor of the anticipating disclosure, having contributed significantly 
to conceiving details of the ‘054 device’s electrical system, beyond 
King’s broad initial idea.810 
E.   Patent Term Adjustment 
The Federal Circuit issued three cases surrounding patent term 
adjustment (“PTA”). 
First, in Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu,811 the court 
determined that the USPTO exceeded its statutory authority when 
issuing a reduction in PTA for a drug patent based on unavoidable 
delay.812 The question before the Federal Circuit was whether the 
 
 804. Id. at 1356. 
 805. Id. 
 806. Id. 
 807. Id. 
 808. Id. at 1357. 
 809. Id. at 1358. 
 810. Id. at 1359. 
 811. 913 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 812. Id. at 1352. 
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USPTO could reduce PTA by a period that exceeded the “time during 
which the applicant failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude 
prosecution.”813 Because there were no efforts that Supernus could 
have taken during most of the delay, the Federal Circuit held that the 
USPTO’s assessment was contrary to the plain meaning of the 
statute.814 The total reduction was not equal to the period during which 
Supernus failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude 
prosecution.815 As such, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the 
district court’s final judgment.816 
Second, the court in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research 
v. Iancu817 evaluated whether PTA was available where there was 
continued examination after an interference proceeding had 
concluded.818 Here, Mayo argued that declaration of an interference 
terminates an applicant’s request for continued examination time for 
the purposes of calculating patent office delay such that it comprises an 
indication of allowability, much like notice of allowance.819 As such, 
Mayo believed that PTA should include all of the time after the 
expiration of the interference, as any further evaluation of patentability 
would constitute delay attributable to the USPTO, not the applicant.820 
The USPTO, the district court, and ultimately the Federal Circuit 
disagreed.821 Relying mostly on USPTO procedures and statutory 
interpretation, the Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that it upheld the 
USPTO’s interpretation of “any time consumed by continued 
examination of the application requested by the applicant under [35 
U.S.C. § ] 132(b).”822 The Federal Circuit explained that following the 
filing of a Request for Continued Examination (“RCE”), “the time 
between termination of an interference and the date of mailing of the 
Notice of Allowance is ‘time consumed by continued examination of 
the application requested by the applicant.’”823 
 
 813. Id. at 1357 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(C)(i)(2012)). 
 814. Id. at 1360–61. 
 815. Id. at 1360. 
 816. Id. at 1361. 
 817. 938 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 818. Id. at 1345. 
 819. Id. at 1348. 
 820. Id. 
 821. Id. at 1348–51. 
 822. Id. at 1345 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012)). 
 823. Id. at 1351 (quoting § 154(b)(1)(i)). 
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Finally, in Intra-Cellular Therapies, Inc. v. Iancu,824 the Federal Circuit 
again addressed the issue of PTA.825 This appeal came out of a district 
court’s decision to uphold the determination of PTA by the USPTO.826 
The primary issue before the Federal Circuit was “whether an applicant 
submission, filed after a final Office action, that continues to argue the 
merits of the examiner’s rejection, without good cause” may 
accumulate applicant delay for PTA.827 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO properly 
constructed the PTA statute with respect to its interpretation of an 
after-final submission that failed to put the application in condition for 
allowance.828 The court held that Intra-Cellular’s response constituted 
a “fail[ure] to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution,” 
and as such, the district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the USPTO.829 
F.   Federal Circuit Procedures 
The court had occasion to analyze Federal Circuit standing after an 
IPR. In Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,830 
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Momenta”) petitioned for an IPR of 
a patent owned by Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”).831 The 
patent covered a product that BMS marketed under the brand name 
Orencia®.832 At the time Momenta petitioned for IPR, it was 
attempting to develop a biosimilar counterpart to the Orencia® 
product.833 The Board sustained patentability of the claims and 
Momenta appealed to the Federal Circuit.834 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dismissed Momenta’s appeal for lack 
of standing and mootness.835 BMS argued that Momenta lacked 
standing because its proposed product had failed clinical trials and had 
 
 824. 938 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 825. Id. at 1373. 
 826. Id. 
 827. Id. at 1379. 
 828. Id. at 1381. 
 829. Id. at 1380–81, 1384 (alteration in original). 
 830. 915 F.3d 764 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 831. Id. at 765. 
 832. Id. at 765–66. 
 833. Id. at 766. 
 834. Id. at 765–66. 
 835. Id. at 770. 
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been withdrawn.836 BMS supported this assertion with press releases 
and SEC filings from Momenta that revealed it had terminated its 
participation in the development program for the biosimilar.837 The 
Federal Circuit held that because of this termination, Momenta had 
failed to show “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that was 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”838 Further, IPR 
estoppel did not create an injury-in-fact because Momenta was no 
longer engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible 
infringement suit.839 As a result, Momenta further lacked standing to 
appeal.840 The Federal Circuit also determined that the appeal was 
moot because Momenta ceased the potential infringement and thus 
ended the potential for injury.841 
VI.    REMEDIES 
A.   Attorney Fees 
Attorney fees were a hot topic in the Federal Circuit this year. In Elbit 
Systems Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Systems, LLC,842 following a 
finding that Hughes infringed Elbit’s ‘073 patent, the jury at the district 
court awarded Elbit over $21 million in damages.843 Notably, the district 
court also found this case was exceptional and awarded Elbit attorney 
fees.844 At issue on appeal was infringement of claims two through four of 
the ‘073 patent and the exceptionality determination; as the district court 
did not quantify the award of attorney fees, the Federal Circuit only 
addressed the district court’s exceptionality finding.845 
The Federal Circuit, while affirming the jury’s damages award, held 
it lacked jurisdiction to rule on whether this was an exceptional case 
and whether Elbit was entitled to attorney fees.846 Relying on Budinich 
v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,847 “the Supreme Court insisted on cleanly 
 
 836. Id. at 766. 
 837. Id. at 767. 
 838. Id. at 768 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 839. Id. at 768–69. 
 840. Id. at 770. 
 841. Id. 
 842. 927 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 843. Id. at 1295. 
 844. Id. 
 845. Id. at 1295–96. 
 846. Id. at 1303. 
 847. 486 U.S. 196 (1988). 
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separating, for finality purposes, the decision on the merits of a case 
from the decision on attorney’s fees.”848 The court explained that an 
award of attorney fees is not a final decision entitled to appellate review 
until the award has been quantified.849 Further, the court rejected 
Hughes’ argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) provided a basis “to 
review entitlement to fees before quantification.”850 While 
§ 1292(c)(2) provides appellate review of fees that are otherwise 
reviewable except for “accounting” issues, the Federal Circuit 
explained that § 1292(c)(2) only dealt with issues involving merits of 
the case: “[a]s already explained, under Budinich, unquantified fees 
are not part of what is reviewable under § 1295 and so they are not part 
of what § 1292(c)(2) makes appealable.”851 The court also rejected 
Hughes’ argument that the court should exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction and concluded it lacked jurisdiction in determining 
whether attorney fees were warranted.852 
The Federal Circuit, in Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,853 vacated the 
district court’s award of attorney fees.854 Cellspin asserted a number of 
patents directed toward “connecting a data capture device, e.g., a 
digital camera, to a mobile device so that a user can automatically 
publish content from the data capture device to a website.”855 The 
district court granted Fitbit’s motion to dismiss because it held 
Cellspin’s claims were directed toward the abstract idea of “acquiring, 
transferring, and publishing data and multimedia content on one or 
more websites.”856 As such, the patents were unpatentable vis-à-vis 35 
U.S.C. § 101.857 The lower court also found this case to be exceptional, 
concluding Cellspin’s “claims were ‘exceptionally meritless’” because 
they were directed to an abstract idea.858 
 
 848. Elbit, 927 F.3d at 1303 (citing Budinich, 486 U.S. at 196, 202–03). 
 849. Id. at 1303–04. 
 850. Id. 
 851. Id. at 1304–05 (stating Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 269 F.3d 1340, 1343 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2001) indicates attorney fees are not an “accounting”). 
 852. Id. at 1305–06. 
 853. 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 854. Id. at 1320. 
 855. Id. at 1309. 
 856. Id. at 1313 (quoting Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1150 
(N.D. Cal. 2018)). 
 857. Id. 
 858. Id. at 1314. 
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The Federal Circuit held the district court erred in various aspects of its 
analysis.859 Regarding attorney fees, the court rejected the district court’s 
allegation that Cellspin should have “filed a ‘test case’ before asserting its 
patents” because there is a presumption of validity of patents and a 
presumption that “the Patent and Trademark Office has already 
examined whether the patent satisfies ‘the prerequisites for issuance of a 
patent,’ including § 101.”860 The Federal Circuit also held that the district 
court erred in “amending its complaint just a few days before the 
scheduled hearing” to align with the district court’s scheduling order 
because “Cellspin’s amendment was timely based on a scheduling order 
entered by the district court just three days before Cellspin’s 
amendment.”861 “The district court’s error in granting the motions to 
dismiss necessitate[d] vacatur of its attorney fees award.”862 
In ATEN International Co. v. Uniclass Technology Co.,863 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision the case did not meet an 
“exceptional case” worthy of an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285.864 On appeal, appellants argued that the cost of litigation was not 
proportional to the award sought.865 Appellants attempted to argue that the 
cost of litigation, which included over $700,000 in expert witness fees alone, 
was not proportional to the maximum $678,337 in reasonable royalty 
damages that could be awarded.866 The Federal Circuit rejected this 
argument and explained that “[t]here is no per se rule that a case is 
exceptional if litigation costs exceed the potential damages.”867 The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that parties bring suit for more reasons than monetary 
damages and identified that ATEN additionally sought injunctive relief.868 
According to the Federal Circuit, nothing in the record supported the 
argument that the district court abused its discretion in holding that this 
case was not exceptional under the totality of the circumstances, and thus, 
ATEN was not entitled to attorney fees.869 
 
 859. Id. at 1320. 
 860. Id. at 1319 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95–96 (2011)). 
 861. Id. at 1319–20. 
 862. Id. at 1319. 
 863. 932 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 864. Id. at 1374; see 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (providing that a court “in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”). 
 865. ATEN Int’l Co., 932 F.3d at 1373. 
 866. Id. 
 867. Id. 
 868. Id. 
 869. Id. at 1373–74. 
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In ThermoLife International LLC v. GNC Corp.,870 ThermoLife 
International LLC (“ThermoLife”) appealed a district court decision 
awarding attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 as an exceptional case.871 
ThermoLife, the exclusive licensee of four patents from Stanford 
University, filed eighty-one infringement suits (including those against 
defendants Hi-Tech and Vital) alleging that defendants directly and 
indirectly infringed Stanford’s patents directed to methods and 
compositions of the amino acids arginine and lysine to enhance 
vascular function and physical performance.872 ThermoLife supported 
its allegations by pointing to the defendants’ labels and 
advertisements.873 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court 
that ThermoLife was unjustified in alleging infringement because it 
failed to investigate with even simple tests of the accused products to 
determine their ingredients.874 Furthermore, without an adequate pre-
filing investigation, ThermoLife irresponsibly brought infringement 
suits against an excessive amount of defendants and exhibited a 
pattern of misconduct that suggested ThermoLife “brought suit 
against many defendants without carefully reviewing their claims as a 
calculated risk that might yield nuisance-value settlements.”875 The 
Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
decision to call this an exceptional case and award attorney fees.876 
Although infringement was not litigated and adjudicated, and thus the 
case history provided an “unusual basis” for fees, the plaintiffs were not 
denied any procedural rights.877 The defendants’ failure to give early 
notice of the defects in ThermoLife’s infringement contentions was also 
not a basis for finding the fees award to be an abuse of discretion.878 
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether Facebook was a 
prevailing party warranting a costs award in B.E. Technology, L.L.C. v. 
 
 870. 922 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 871. Id. at 1350. 
 872. Id. at 1350, 1352. 
 873. Id. at 1352. 
 874. Id. at 1355, 1358. The district court determined that one gram of L-arginine or 
its salt form was required to show infringement, id. at 1359, and plaintiffs did not deny 
that the products were publicly available, or that simple tests existed to determine the 
accused product’s composition. Id. at 1354. 
 875. Id. at 1355 (quoting ThermoLife Int’l, LLC v. Myogenix Corp., No. 13cv651 
JLS (MDD), 2017 WL 1235766, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2017)). 
 876. Id. at 1356. 
 877. Id. at 1357. 
 878. Id. at 1357–58. 
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Facebook, Inc.879 In this case, B.E. Technology, L.L.C. (“B.E.”) sued 
Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) alleging patent infringement.880 Ultimately, 
those patent claims were found to be unpatentable in IPR proceedings at 
the USPTO.881 Facebook moved the district court for judgment on the 
pleadings to dismiss the case with prejudice and costs under Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12(c) and 54(d).882 The district court, agreeing with 
B.E., dismissed the case as moot, but it also found that Facebook was a 
“prevailing party” and awarded $4,424.20 in costs.883 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed its own and Supreme 
Court precedent on the question of what constituted a “prevailing 
party.”884 The Federal Circuit noted that “[a] decision [by the district 
court] with judicial imprimatur is required to give rise to prevailing 
party status.”885 “That the merits of the decision cancelling the claims 
occurred in the PTO rather than the district court does not change the 
fact that the district court dismissed the claims it had before it, albeit 
for mootness. It thereby placed a judicial imprimatur upon B.E.’s claim 
for patent infringement.”886 
B.   Willful Infringement 
The Federal Circuit had occasion to discuss willful infringement this 
year. In SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the jury had awarded 
treble damages after finding that Cisco had willfully infringed SRI’s 
patent.887 Cisco appealed, arguing that it was not aware of the patent 
until SRI sent Cisco a notice letter.888 The Federal Circuit agreed. The 
court noted that without knowledge of the patent, there could be no 





 879. 940 F.3d 675, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 880. Id. 
 881. Id. 
 882. Id. at 676–77. 
 883. Id. at 677. 
 884. Id. at 677–78. 
 885. Id. at 678. 
 886. Id. at 679. 
 887. 930 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 888. Id. at 1308–09. 
 889. Id. at 1309–10. 
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VII.    DISTRICT COURT 
A.   Procedural 
The Federal Circuit’s 2019 rulings on procedural issues touched on 
many important topics. In Quest Integrity USA, LLC v. Cokebusters USA 
Inc.,890 the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s summary 
judgment decision on invalidity because it improperly disregarded 
expert declarations under the sham affidavit doctrine.891 The district 
court held that five of Quest Integrity USA, LLC’s (“Quest’s”) patented 
claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the on-sale bar.892 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of 
invalidity as to three of the asserted claims but reversed the judgment 
as to the other two because the district court improperly dismissed two 
of Quest’s declarations as sham affidavits.893 These declarations were 
from two of Quest’s experts and testified as to whether the invention 
met a disputed claim limitation.894 The Federal Circuit ruled that the 
district court misapplied the sham affidavit doctrine as to the first 
affidavit because, though this affidavit did contradict earlier testimony 
of the other expert, it did not contradict the earlier testimony of this 
affidavit’s author.895 The other declaration, the Federal Circuit said, 
was not a sham affidavit because it did not simply contradict the earlier 
testimony but plausibly explained in great detail why the former 
testimony was incorrect.896 The court noted that the testimony of this 
affidavit was corroborated by other evidence of record.897 
In Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp.,898 the Federal Circuit denied 
CalAmp Corp.’s (“CalAmp’s”) appeal of the district court’s ruling on 
 
 890. 924 F.3d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 891. Id. at 1222. A sham affidavit is a declaration by a witness that contradicts his or 
her earlier testimony, therefore calling that witness’s credibility into question. Id. at 
1232. Courts in the Third Circuit (where this case arose) are especially weary of sham 
affidavits during motions for summary judgment. See id. 
 892. Id. at 1222. Quest’s activities met the on-sale bar because even though it did not sell 
its furnace inspection hardware or software, it used its method, computer-readable medium, 
and system commercially to perform services for a paying customer. Id. at 1227. 
 893. Id. at 1222. 
 894. Id. at 1226. 
 895. Id. at 1232–33. 
 896. Id. at 1233. 
 897. Id. at 1234. 
 898. 920 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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invalidity for failing to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46.899 
Although CalAmp properly preserved its issue for appeal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, it failed to specifically identify the 
grounds for the appeal under Rule 46,900 which requires “‘a party, at 
the time the ruling or order of the trial judge is . . . sought, make 
known to the court the action that he desires the court to take . . . and 
the grounds therefor,’ otherwise a claim of error is typically forfeited.”901 
At trial, the jury found the claims not invalid based on prior art 
presented at trial.902 CalAmp asserted on appeal that had the district 
court adopted its proposed claim constructions, its validity defenses 
would have included additional prior art references that are now 
irrelevant.903 But CalAmp failed to specifically identify during or after 
the Markman proceeding any prior art that would be impacted by the 
claim construction ruling.904 CalAmp appealed the invalidity findings by 
referring to additional prior art, but the Federal Circuit declined 
CalAmp’s “invitation to speculate as to how additional prior art may have 
been rendered irrelevant under the court’s claim construction.”905 
Finally, in TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Systems International, Inc.,906 
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Sealant 
Systems International, Inc.’s (“SSI”) motion for a partial new trial on 
validity.907 After a prior appeal in which the Federal Circuit instructed 
the district court to rule that TEK Global’s (“TEK”) patents were not 
invalid based on an obviousness theory combining the Bridgestone 
and Eriksen references, the district court barred SSI from presenting 
other obviousness theories based on those same references.908 The 
Federal Circuit held that one foreclosed obviousness theory did not 
preclude SSI from presenting other obviousness theories based on new 
 
 899. Id. at 1341, 1343. 
 900. Id. at 1343. 
 901. Id. at 1342 (alternation in original) (quoting 9B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2472 (3d ed. 2018)). 
 902. Id. 
 903. Id. 
 904. Id. at 1342–43. 
 905. Id. at 1343. 
 906. 920 F.3d 777 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 907. Id. at 780. 
 908. Id. at 784. 
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combinations of the Bridgestone and Eriksen references that were not 
previously before the court.909 
However, the court also affirmed the district court’s denial of SSI’s 
motion for a new trial on infringement.910 During its closing argument 
at trial, TEK indirectly compared the accused product to its 
commercial product. SSI objected on the ground that for an 
infringement analysis, the factfinder must only compare the accused 
product to the claims of the patent, not the plaintiff’s patent.911 The 
district court allowed TEK to make the product-to-product comparison 
because TEK’s product was a commercial embodiment of the patent, 
and the comparison was merely in response to SSI’s own comparisons 
of the products.912 The Federal Circuit held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the comparison for this limited 
purpose and sufficiently mitigated any potential jury confusion or 
prejudice when it instructed the jury not to perform a product-to-
product comparison to decide the infringement issue.913 
B.   Motion to Amend Complaint 
In Anza Technology, Inc. v. Mushkin, Inc.,914 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a district court decision that declined to apply the relation-
back doctrine and barred the lawsuit.915 The case started in March 2017 
when Anza Technology, Inc. (“Anza”) sued Mushkin, Inc. (“Mushkin”) 
alleging patent infringement.916 Anza filed a first amended complaint 
on September 6, 2017, joining Avant Technology, Inc. as a 
codefendant.917 The district court then granted a motion severing the 
claims against Mushkin and transferred the case to the District of 
Colorado.918 After the transfer, Anza conceded that the claims against 
 
 909. Id. The Federal Circuit of course warned the district court to exercise caution 
during retrial and to not allow the parties to present evidence of related noninstitution 
decisions by the PTO. Id. at 784 n.1. 
 910. Id. at 789. 
 911. Id. at 787–88 (citing Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 
1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 912. Id. at 788–89. 
 913. Id. at 789. 
 914. 934 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 915. Id. at 1362. 
 916. Id. 
 917. Id. at 1363. 
 918. Id. 
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Mushkin were not viable after engaging in mediation.919 This led to Anza 
filing a second amended complaint, which Mushkin moved to dismiss.920 
Anza’s second amended complaint removed the original 
infringement allegations and added new allegations of infringement of 
two different patents.921 Additionally, it involved two products that had 
not been involved in the original complaint.922 Ultimately, the district 
court granted Mushkin’s motion to dismiss because the amended 
complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and the 
alleged infringing activity occurred more than six years before the date 
the second amended complaint was filed.923 
The Federal Circuit reviewed this determination through a “‘logical 
relationship’ standard” by looking at five factors: “the overlap of parties, 
products or processes, time periods, licensing and technology 
agreements, and product or process development and manufacture.”924 
The court held that the overlap of the parties and products was quite 
clear, but the focus of its analysis was on the underlying technology 
and the time periods.925 
The court held that, regarding the technology, the products in the 
second amended complaint sought to solve the same problems using 
the same methods.926 Additionally, the court held that, with respect to 
time periods, there would be “no lack of notice and no substantial 
prejudice to Mushkin from having to defend against independent 
claims over a shorter period than the period set forth in the original 
complaint.”927 In light of this analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
dismissal of claims toward the overlapping products and vacated the 
dismissal and remanded to determine relation back with respect to the 




 919. Id. at 1364. 
 920. Id. at 1364–65. 
 921. Id. at 1364. 
 922. Id. 
 923. Id. at 1365–66. 
 924. Id. at 1369 (citing Futurewei Techs., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., 677 F.3d 
704, 710 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 925. Id. at 1370, 1372–73. 
 926. Id. at 1370. 
 927. Id. at 1372. 
 928. Id. at 1373. 
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C.   Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit addressed jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment 
action in Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. LABOKLIN GmbH & Co. 
KG.929 LABOKLIN GmbH & Co. KG (“LABOKLIN”), a German 
company, licensed a patent owned by the University of Bern, an 
instrumentality of the Swiss Confederation.930 LABOKLIN sent a cease 
and desist letter to Paw Prints Genetics (“PPG”), a U.S. company doing 
business as Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc., at its business in 
Spokane, Washington.931 In response to the cease and desist letter, PPG 
sought a declaratory judgment that the patent being enforced was 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.932 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that it had 
jurisdiction over LABOKLIN and the University, citing Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).933 This rule instructs a court to look at a 
litigant’s minimum contacts with the United States generally, rather 
than any specific state.934 With respect to LABOKLIN, the Federal 
Circuit held the company had sufficient minimum contacts based on 
the fact that it sent a cease and desist letter into the United States, 
threatened a U.S. company’s business, and additionally licensed the 
patent to two other U.S. companies.935 The court held that it was 
“reasonable and fair” for it to have jurisdiction under the 
circumstances because LABOKLIN “availed itself of the benefits and 
protections of U.S. laws.”936 
The court analyzed jurisdiction over the University under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).937 Under the FSIA, “a 
foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United 
States courts” unless an exception applies.938 Immunity is detached if a 
foreign state “engages in ‘commercial activity . . . in the United 
 
 929. 933 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 930. Id. 
 931. Id. 
 932. Id. at 1308. 
 933. Id. at 1308–09, 1312. 
 934. Id. at 1309 (citing Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. 
Medico, 536 F.3d 1285, 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 935. Id. at 1310–11. 
 936. Id. at 1311. 
 937. Id. at 1312; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 et. seq. 
 938. Genetic Veterinary Scis., 933 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 
U.S. 349, 355 (1993)). 
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States.’”939 Federal Circuit precedent states that obtaining and 
subsequently licensing or enforcing a U.S. patent is sufficient 
commercial activity to overcome the FSIA’s presumption.940 Here, the 
University not only obtained the patent but also participated in the 
enforcement of it with LABOKLIN.941 For these reasons, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdiction decision for each 
party.942 The court subsequently held the patent to be ineligible under 
§ 101 as claiming a natural phenomenon.943 
D.   Venue 
Venue continued to be a hot topic at the Federal Circuit in the wake 
of TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.944 In In re Google 
LLC,945 the Federal Circuit elected not to decide en banc “whether 
servers . . . are a regular and established place of business, such that venue 
is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b).”946 
SEVEN Networks alleged Google, LLC’s (“Google”) servers, stored 
in a third-party ISP’s facility, where the allegedly infringing activities 
occurred, were a regular and established place of business, establishing 
proper venue under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b).947 
The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss for improper 
venue.948 As a result, Google petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of 
mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or transfer the case 
for improper venue.949 On appeal, the panel majority found 
mandamus relief inappropriate because “it is not known if the district 
court’s ruling involves the kind of broad and fundamental legal 
questions relevant to § 1400(b),” and “it would be appropriate to allow 
the issue to percolate in the district courts so as to more clearly define 
 
 939. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012)). 
 940. Id. at 1312–13. 
 941. Id. at 1314. 
 942. Id. 
 943. Id. at 1318. 
 944. See 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (holding that, for purposes of the patent venue 
statute, a domestic corporation only “resides” in its state of incorporation). 
 945. 914 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 946. Id. at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 947. Id. 
 948. Seven Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (E.D. Tex. 2018). 
 949. In re Google LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00442-JRG, 2018 WL 5536478, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 29, 2019) (per curiam). 
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the importance, scope, and nature of the issue for us to review.”950 
Google petitioned for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc.951 
The panel denied the petition for panel rehearing, and, after a poll of 
the full Federal Circuit was taken, the petition for rehearing en banc 
was also denied.952 
Then, in Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.,953 Westech Aerosol Corp. 
(“Westech”) appealed the District Court for the Western District of 
Washington’s decision of granting 3M’s motion to dismiss for 
improper venue.954 The procedural history of Westech is complex: 
during pendency of the case, the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
TC Heartland LLC and the Federal Circuit released its opinions in In re 
Cray Inc.955 and In re ZTE (USA) Inc.956 The district court concluded that 
Westech failed to prove that 3M Co. (“3M”) had a regular and 
established place of business in the Western District of Washington and 
granted 3M’s motion.957 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decisions, 
concluding that Westech had failed to demonstrate venue or that 
defendant had a “regular and established place of business physically 
located within the judicial district,” as required by ZTE and In re Cray.958 
In fact, the court held Westech failed to plead “any facts” establishing 
3M’s regular and established place of business.959 In discussing 3M’s 
motion for sanctions, the court held that because ZTE was decided 
post-filing the appeal, Westech did not frivolously file the appeal; 
however, Westech’s appeal was frivolous as argued because Westech 
was aware of the holding of In re Cray and ZTE and proceeded with the 
appeal.960 The court ultimately held the district court properly granted 
3M’s motion to dismiss and denied 3M’s motion for sanctions.961 
 
 950. Id. at *2–3. 
 951. In re Google, 914 F.3d at 1377–78 (per curiam). 
 952. Id. at 1378. 
 953. 927 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 954. Id. at 1380. 
 955. 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (outlining the requirements for proper 
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) including that the defendant has a physical place in 
the district that serves as a regular and established place of business). 
 956. 890 F.3d 1008, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden 
of establishing proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)). 
 957. Westech, 927 F.3d at 1381. 
 958. Id. at 1382 (citing In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360, 1364–67). 
 959. Id. 
 960. Id. at 1383. 
 961. Id. 
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E.   Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Interestingly, the court was asked to perform a federal question 
analysis. The dispute in Inspired Development Group, LLC v. Inspired 
Products Group, LLC962 started as a business dispute around patent 
licensing.963 Both parties to the case relied on diversity jurisdiction to 
bring the lawsuit and corresponding counterclaims in federal court.964 
While on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
spotted a “potentially fatal problem”; namely, there were doubts that 
diversity of citizenship existed.965 Under Eleventh Circuit law, there 
must be diversity between all members of both limited liability 
corporations involved in the dispute, something that both parties 
agreed did not exist.966 Then, for the first time, the appellee argued 
that the case involved a federal question because the case involved 
patent law.967 The Eleventh Circuit then remanded the case to let the 
district court answer that question.968 The district court ultimately found 
that there was a federal question, and thus, federal subject matter 
jurisdiction existed, so the case was transferred to the Federal Circuit.969 
Once at the Federal Circuit, the discussion focused on whether the 
claims were deemed to arise under federal law based on the four part 
test highlighted in Gunn v. Minton.970 The Federal Circuit quickly 
disposed of the first two factors of analysis, holding that resolving a 
question of infringement was not a “necessary element” of the case and 
that, while patent infringement was actually disputed, it was not a 
necessary element of any claim.971 The court’s focus was on the third 
factor, whether the federal issue was “substantial.”972 Relying on 
Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit stated that a 
substantial federal issue is “more likely to be present” when (1) “a pure 
issue of [federal] law is dispositive of the case”; (2) “the court’s 
resolution of the issue will control numerous other cases”; and (3) 
[t]he Government . . . has a direct interest in the availability of the 
 
 962. 938 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 963. Id. at 1358. 
 964. Id. at 1359. 
 965. Id. 
 966. Id. 
 967. Id. at 1360. 
 968. Id. 
 969. Id. 
 970. 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). 
 971. Inspired Dev., 938 F.3d at 1363. 
 972. Id. 
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federal forum to vindicate its own administrative action.”973 The court 
ultimately held that the third Gunn factor did not support a finding of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction because the patent infringement 
claim was not a substantial issue in the case.974 
F.   Personal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity 
Public universities in two patent cases challenged the courts’ ability 
to hear infringement cases due to sovereign immunity. In University of 
Florida Research Foundation, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,975 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of General Electric’s (“GE”) 
motion to dismiss University of Florida Research Foundation’s 
(“UFRF”) allegations of infringement.976 In 2017, UFRF sued GE 
alleging infringement of the ‘251 patent, which described “a method 
and system for ‘integrat[ing] physiologic data from at least one bedside 
machine.’”977 GE filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims of 
the ‘251 patent were directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101, which the district court granted.978 
On appeal, UFRF argued that the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear GE’s § 101 eligibility challenge because 
UFRF enjoyed sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.979 
The Federal Circuit held that UFRF consented to federal court 
jurisdiction, thus waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity, when it 
brought the infringement claim against GE.980 The Federal Circuit 
explained that the waiver of immunity extends not only to the cause of 
action but to any relevant defenses GE brought, including the § 101 
challenge.981 After confirming subject matter jurisdiction on the § 101 
eligibility challenge, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that UFRF’s ‘251 patent was directed to an abstract idea.982 
 
 973. Id. at 1364 (alterations in original) (quoting NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law 
Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 974. Id. at 1368. 
 975. 916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 976. Id. at 1364. 
 977. Id. at 1366 (alteration in original). 
 978. Id. at 1364. 
 979. Id. 
 980. Id. at 1365. 
 981. Id. at 1366. 
 982. Id. at 1368–69. 
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The court in Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Boston 
Scientific Corp.983 addressed issues of venue and state sovereignty. Here, the 
Board of Regents for the University of Texas sued Boston Scientific in the 
Western District of Texas.984 The Board of Regents acted as an arm of the 
state of Texas, and Boston Scientific was a Delaware corporation.985 
Acknowledging that Boston Scientific had little to no ties in Texas, 
the Board of Regents argued that venue was proper because it had state 
sovereignty, the district court had personal jurisdiction over Boston 
Scientific and because it would “offend the dignity of the State to 
require it to pursue persons who have harmed the State outside that 
territory of Texas.”986 The Board of Regents further argued that the 
Eleventh Amendment protected it from being compelled to respond 
to counterclaims outside its territory.987 The district court held that 
Boston Scientific did not have an established place of business in the 
Western District of Texas, rejected the state sovereignty argument, and 
ultimately transferred the case to the District of Delaware.988 
On appeal, the court held that state sovereignty does not grant the 
right to bring suit in an otherwise improper venue.989 First, the court 
explained, sovereign immunity does not apply when challenging a 
venue transfer where the State acts solely as a plaintiff.990 The Board of 
Regents also argued that “the Original Jurisdiction Clause ensures a 
State cannot be forced to sue in a court located in another State.”991 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the Original Jurisdiction 
Clause does not allow a State to bring suit in any forum that it would 
like, as long as there is personal jurisdiction.992 The clause grants the 
ability of States “to sue in lower courts in addition to the Supreme 
Court”—not any forum regardless of venue rules.993 Additionally, the 
Federal Circuit held that “[w]hen a state sues in federal court, it waives 
sovereign immunity with respect to its asserted claims, subjecting itself 
 
 983. 936 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 984. Id. at 1369. 
 985. Id. 
 986. Id. 
 987. Id. 
 988. Id. at 1370. 
 989. Id. at 1374. 
 990. Id. at 1377. 
 991. Id. 
 992. Id. at 1379. 
 993. Id. at 1378. 
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to the jurisdiction of the federal courts” and it must comply with 
federal rules and procedures, including venue rules.994 
The Board of Regents’s last argument, that it was not subject to the 
District of Delaware’s jurisdiction because it did not waive its 
sovereignty in Delaware, was rejected, too.995 The Federal Circuit again 
stated that sovereign immunity did not apply to a state acting solely as 
a plaintiff, and thus, the issues of waiver were irrelevant.996 
G.   Appellate Jurisdiction 
In another interesting case, the Federal Circuit was asked to 
determine whether it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 to hear 
a patent licensing case. In Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Office Depot Inc.,997 
Princeton Digital licensed the patent at issue to Adobe and promised not 
to sue Adobe or Adobe’s customers for claims arising “in whole or part 
owing to an Adobe Licensed Product.”998 When Princeton Digital brought 
lawsuits against Adobe’s customers, Adobe intervened and asserted a 
claim against Princeton Digital for breach of contract and sought 
damages.999 On summary judgment, the district court held that Adobe 
could only recover fees associated with defending its customers, as 
opposed to the affirmative claim for breach of contract.1000 But the district 
court substantially limited Adobe’s request for damages prior to trial, 
rendering further litigation possibly financially unreasonable.1001 To 
accelerate the district court’s damage-limiting decision toward appeal, 
Adobe then asked the court to enter judgment for Princeton Digital, on 
the grounds that it did not have evidence of damages to present at trial, 
which it contended was an element of its claim.1002 The district court 
granted Adobe’s request, but specifically stated that there were defensive 
damages that could be proven on the existing record.1003 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the “final judgment” 
entered in the district court lacked the finality required by the Federal 
 
 994. Id. at 1380. 
 995. Id. at 1381–82. 
 996. Id. at 1382. 
 997. 913 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 998. Id. at 1344. 
 999. Id. 
 1000. Id. at 1345. 
 1001. Id. 
 1002. Id. 
 1003. Id. 
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Rules to warrant appellate jurisdiction.1004 The court held that because 
Adobe could have proceeded to trial on one of its claims, there was no 
final decision on the merits, even though Adobe “persuade[d] [the] 
district court to issue an order purporting to end the litigation.”1005 
H.   Standing 
The court issued two opinions on party standing. In Lone Star Silicon 
Innovations LLC v. Nanya Technology Corp.,1006 Lone Star was a licensee 
of Advanced Micro Devices’s (“AMD”) patents.1007 The lower court 
applied the “all substantial rights” test in determining whether Lone 
Star could bring suit.1008 While the agreement indicated “‘all right[s], 
title, and interest’ in the asserted patents [belonged] to Lone Star,” 
Judge O’Malley indicated the court must “examine the ‘totality’ of the 
agreement to determine whether a party other than the original 
patentee has established that it obtained all substantial rights in the 
patent.”1009 The court, focusing on enforcement and alienation 
amongst other patent rights, concluded that because AMD did not 
transfer these rights to Lone Star, “Lone Star is therefore not the 
relevant patentee and cannot assert . . . patents in its own name under 
§ 281.”1010 The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing 
the case.1011 The court concluded that the district court inaccurately 
interchanged standing requirements with patent rights: “whether a party 
possesses all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or 
subject-matter jurisdiction.”1012 As such, and in accordance with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district 
court to determine whether AMD’s joinder was required.1013 
Also, in Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Inc.,1014 
Sanofi sued multiple defendants for infringement of two of its 
patents.1015 While the district court case was pending, the USPTO 
 
 1004. Id. at 1349–50. 
 1005. Id. at 1350 (alterations in original). 
 1006. 925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1007. Id. at 1228. 
 1008. Id. at 1229. 
 1009. Id. at 1228–29. 
 1010. Id. at 1231. 
 1011. Id. at 1237–39. 
 1012. Id. at 1235–36. 
 1013. Id. at 1239. 
 1014. 933 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1015. Id. at 1371. 
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instituted IPR of one of the patents.1016 The Board held claims one 
through five and seven through thirty unpatentable as obvious and 
would not allow Sanofi to amend the claims subsequently.1017 Sanofi 
did not appeal the decision with respect to claims seven, eleven, 
fourteen through sixteen, and twenty-six, but it did, however, file a 
statutory disclaimer as to those claims.1018 Despite having notice of the 
statutory disclaimer, the district court concluded that a case or 
controversy still existed, and it invalidated the claims as obvious.1019 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that an actual case or 
controversy must exist at all stages of the case.1020 The court concluded 
that when Sanofi filed the disclaimer “it ‘effectively eliminated those 
claims from the . . . patent.’”1021 Thus, any case or controversy that 
existed was moot.1022 The Federal Circuit noted that in some cases, a 
case or controversy may exist even when there is no risk of 
infringement, but the defendants have not demonstrated that in this 
case.1023 Because of these reasons, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s decision.1024 
I.   Ethical Representation 
In a rare case, the Federal circuit decided motions to disqualify 
counsel. In Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Generico, LLC,1025 two attorneys 
representing Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. changed firms and 
continued to represent Mylan in the related actions.1026 The attorneys’ 
new firm was engaged in a concurrent trademark representation for a 
corporate affiliate of two parties adverse to Mylan in the appeal.1027 The 
court held there was no applicable framework in the precedent of the 
relevant regional circuits, so the court applied a two-factor test from 
 
 1016. Id. 
 1017. Id. 
 1018. Id. 
 1019. Id. at 1372. 
 1020. Id. at 1373. 
 1021. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 
F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1022. Id. 
 1023. Id. at 1374. 
 1024. Id. 
 1025. 916 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1026. Id. at 978. 
 1027. Id. at 979. 
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the Second Circuit.1028 The test required examining the degree of 
operational commonality between the affiliated entities and the extent 
to which they were financially interdependent.1029 Ultimately, the court 
held that the two adverse entities were sufficiently interrelated with the 
firm’s client to give rise to an affiliate conflict.1030 
J.   Inventorship 
Coda filed a complaint against Goodyear in Coda Development S.R.O. 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,1031 seeking correction of inventorship on 
several Goodyear patents and alleged misappropriation of Coda’s 
trade secrets.1032 Coda alleged that Goodyear’s patents were the result 
of misappropriated Coda trade secrets, and, as a result, the Coda 
engineer that invented the technology should be listed as an inventor 
on the patents.1033 The district court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and denied 
Coda leave to amend their complaint.1034 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the facts in the complaint, 
including those identified above, lead to reasonable inferences that 
Coda was entitled to a correction of inventorship.1035 The Federal 
Circuit also held that the district court erred when it denied leave to 
file an amended complaint, given the policy of liberally allowing such 
leave and a preference for deciding cases on the merits.1036 
VIII.    DESIGN PATENTS 
As design patent litigation becomes more prevalent, Federal Circuit 
appeals of design patent litigation have become more common. This 
year, there were two precedential design patent appeals. First, in Curver 
Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc.,1037 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the rare issue of design patent claim construction, ultimately 
abrogating a sixty-year-old precedent.1038 This case involved a design 
 
 1028. Id. at 984. 
 1029. Id. 
 1030. Id. at 985. 
 1031. 916 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1032. Id. at 1355. 
 1033. Id. 
 1034. Id. at 1357. 
 1035. Id. at 1359. 
 1036. Id. at 1362. 
 1037. 938 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1038. Id. at 1336. 
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patent titled “Pattern for a Chair” and claiming an “ornamental design 
for a pattern for a chair.”1039 During prosecution, the patent owner 
amended the patent to include such language as to designate a 
“particular article” for the design to overcome the examiner’s 
objection.1040 The defendant made baskets with a similar pattern to the 
plaintiff’s chairs.1041 The district court construed the claim such that it 
was limited to chairs and reached a finding of noninfringement.1042 
On appeal, the plaintiff, Curver, argued that the lower court erred in 
limiting the claim to only include chairs.1043 Specifically, Curver pointed 
out that none of the figures showed a chair.1044 The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument and held that 
design patents are granted only for a design applied to an article of 
manufacture, and not a design per se, we hold that claim language can 
limit the scope of a design patent where the claim language supplies 
the only instance of an article of manufacture that appears nowhere 
in the figures.1045 
Curver also argued that In re Glavas,1046 a long-standing precedent in 
design patent cases, supported its infringement argument.1047 Curver 
used the reasoning in Glavas to argue that when a design is patentable, 
the use of the article of the design is immaterial if the design itself has a 
substantially similar appearance to that of the applicant’s design.1048 
Further, “so far as anticipation by a single prior art disclosure is 
concerned, there can be no question as to non-analogous art in design 
cases.”1049 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the 
standard for design patent infringement changed with the opinion in 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.1050 Consequently, the statement in 
Glavas relating to anticipation was no longer good law, and Curver’s 
reliance on it “lack[ed] merit.”1051 
 
 1039. Id. 
 1040. Id. at 1337. 
 1041. Id. 
 1042. Id. at 1338. 
 1043. Id. at 1339. 
 1044. Id. 
 1045. Id. at 1340. 
 1046. 230 F.2d 447 (CCPA 1956). 
 1047. Curver, 938 F.3d at 1342. 
 1048. Id. 
 1049. Id. 
 1050. Id. at 1342 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 683 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
 1051. Id. at 1343. 
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Then, in Campbell Soup Co. v. Gamon Plus, Inc.,1052 the PTAB found that 
two proposed references were not proper primary references because each 
failed the “basically the same” test.1053 The PTAB found that the first 
reference required substantial modifications, like adding a cylindrical object, 
to appear visually similar to the challenged design.1054 The second reference 
failed because making that design “basically the same” as the challenged 
design would require changing its dimensions and removing parts.1055 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the PTAB that the second reference 
required modifications such that it could not be a proper primary reference, 
but the Federal Circuit disagreed regarding the first reference.1056 The court 
vacated the PTAB’s findings and partially remanded the claims because 
“the ever-so-slight differences in [the] design [of one of the patents], in 
light of the overall similarities,” created “‘basically the same’ visual 
impression as the claimed designs” and thus allowed that reference to 
qualify as a primary reference for a design patent obviousness analysis.1057 
IX.    REISSUE PATENTS 
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the validity of a reissue patent in Forum 
US, Inc. v. Flow Valve, LLC.1058 There, Flow Valve added seven claims to its 
reissue patent but made no changes to the written description or drawings of 
the original patent.1059 The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Forum “on the basis that the written description and drawings of 
the Reissue patent do not ‘explicitly and unequivocally’ indicate the 
invention claimed the reissue claims.”1060 The Federal Circuit affirmed 
this decision, indicating the new claims of the Reissue patent did not 
comply with the original patent requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251: “the 
specification of the original patent must do more than merely suggest or 
indicate the invention recited in reissue claims; . . . the original patent 
‘must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention as a 
separate invention.’”1061 
 
 1052. 939 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1053. Id. at 1041. 
 1054. Id. at 1340. 
 1055. Id. at 1341–42. 
 1056. Id. 
 1057. Id. at 1341–42. 
 1058. 926 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 1059. Id. 
 1060. Id. at 1350. 
 1061. Id. at 1351–52 (quoting Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac Pharma, Inc., 771 F.3d 
1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
